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I. INTRODUCTION
URING 2004 and 2005, the developments in construction and
surety law focused on a wide variety of substantive issues, most
notably decisions regarding sovereign immunity. The Texas Su-
preme Court and many courts of appeals issued decisions regarding a city
or other governmental entity's immunity from suit in a construction
dispute.
Various state and federal courts of appeals also issued decisions regard-
ing pass-through claims, the enforceability of arbitration clauses, payment
and performance bond disputes, general construction disputes,
mechanic's liens, waiver of implied warranties, and insurance coverage in
construction disputes. These courts issued a large number of decisions
that directly impact the construction and surety practitioner. A number
of those decisions are discussed here. Very notably, the various Texas
courts of appeal have continued to discuss and apply the rulings of many
Texas Supreme Court decisions discussed in the last several years' survey
articles.
II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The issue of sovereign immunity and the waiver of immunity from suit
were among the most common subjects for decisions rendered by the
Texas courts in the construction context during 2004 and 2005. Both the
Texas Supreme Court and the various courts of appeal continued to apply
the general rule regarding the "no waiver by conduct" concept, but more
significantly, they turned their attention to immunity from suit excep-
tions, including waiver as a result of a governmental entity filing a claim
or counterclaim and waiver by the language in Texas statutes and city
charters.
Decisions addressing immunity from suit continue to build upon the
law of sovereign immunity established by the Texas Supreme Court over
the last several years. The 2001 and 2002 supreme court decisions set the
stage for this continuing analysis of immunity in the context of construc-
tion disputes. The 2001 opinion in General Services Commission v. Little-
Tex Insulation Co.1 focused on the issue of waiver by conduct, specifically
considering contractor arguments that the state waived immunity by
merely accepting the contract's benefits. In that case, the court con-
cluded that under the new scheme set forth in Government Code Chapter
2260, "a party simply cannot sue the State for breach of contract absent
legislative consent under Chapter 107.2 Compliance with Chapter 2260,
1. 39 S.W.3d 591 (Tex. 2001).
2. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 2260.001-.108 (Vernon 2001).
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therefore, is a necessary step before a party can petition to sue the
State." 3
The Texas Supreme Court adopted a consistent approach in 2002 in
Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission v. IT-Davy.4 The issue
was whether IT-Davy, a general contractor, could sue the Texas Natural
Resource Conservation Commission ("TNRCC"), a state agency, for
breach of contract. IT-Davy argued that it had fully performed under its
contract, but the TNRCC did not fully pay for services it accepted. The
supreme court concluded that merely accepting the benefits of a contract
is not sufficient to establish waiver. 5 In its conclusion, the supreme court
noted again its "one route to the courthouse" rule and emphasis on legis-
lative consent.6 However, Justice Hecht's concurring opinion, which dis-
agrees with the court's broad language, contains perhaps the most
significant analysis and an indication of future decisions on the issue of
sovereign immunity. Justice Hecht doubts "whether governmental immu-
nity from suit for breach of contract can be applied so rigidly," but de-
clines to decide any broader issues not presented by the facts of the case:
In his opinion for the Court in Federal Sign v. Texas Southern Univer-
sity, Justice Baker noted that there may be "circumstances where the
State may waive its immunity by conduct other than simply execut-
ing a contract so that it is not always immune from suit when it con-
tracts." In his opinion today, he appears to have abandoned this
view, stating that "allowing ... governmental entities to waive immu-
nity by conduct that includes accepting benefits under a contract
would be fundamentally inconsistent with our established jurispru-
dence." He does not explain this about-face. The Court was correct
in Federal Sign. As one example, it has long been held that the State
can waive immunity by filing suit. There may be others, such as debt
obligations. We need not here decide the issue for all time, any more
than we needed to in Federal Sign.7
Since these two supreme court cases, contractors and public entities
have focused on arguments regarding the impact of a public entity filing
immunity-from-suit claims or counterclaims. During the Survey period,
the supreme court weighed in on the very important issue of waiver
through filing suit.
A. THE SUPREME COURT AND WAIVER THROUGH FILING SUIT
In 2004, the Texas Supreme Court affirmed earlier case law regarding
sovereign-immunity-doctrine waiver when a public entity files claims or
counterclaims, thereby invoking the jurisdiction of the courts. In Reata
3. Id.
4. 74 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. 2002).
5. Id. at 857.
6. Id. at 860.
7. Id. at 860-61 (J. Hecht, C.J. Phillips, J. Owen, J. Jefferson, concurring) (internal
citations omitted); see Fed. Sign v. Tex. S. Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401, 408 n.1 (Tex. 1997).
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Construction Corp. v. City of Dallas,8 the Texas Supreme Court con-
cluded that a city waives its governmental immunity from suit by assert-
ing claims for affirmative relief in a lawsuit to which it is named as a
party.9 Reata arose out of a construction accident causing property dam-
age. The City of Dallas issued Dynamic Cable Construction a license to
install fiber-optic cable in a downtown area. Dynamic subcontracted with
Reata to drill a conduit. Reata inadvertently drilled into a water main,
flooding a residential building. The building owner sued Dynamic and
Reata, and Reata then filed a third-party claim against the city for alleged
negligence in misidentifying the water main's location.' 0
The city filed special exceptions to the Reata claims, asserting that the
claims were not within the Texas Tort Claims Act's waiver of immunity.
The city also "intervened" to file claims against Dynamic, and later
amended its plea in intervention to assert claims for damages against Re-
ata as well. The city then filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting govern-
mental immunity from suit with respect to Reata's claims. Reata
responded to the plea, contending that governmental immunity did not
apply because the city had subjected itself to jurisdiction by intervening in
the lawsuit and seeking affirmative relief. 1
The trial court denied the city's plea to the jurisdiction, but the court of
appeals reversed, holding that the city's intervention did not waive its
right to assert subject-matter jurisdiction. 12 On appeal, the Texas Su-
preme Court reversed the appellate court's holding:
To the extent the City enjoyed governmental immunity from suit
with regard to Reata's claims, the City waived that immunity by in-
tervening in the lawsuit and asserting claims for damages against Re-
ata. Therefore, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over
Reata's claims against the City, and the court of appeals erred in
dismissing them.' 3
The supreme court's holding in Reata is completely consistent with Jus-
tice Hecht's opinion in IT-Davy and with established authority recogniz-
ing that when the state invokes the court's jurisdiction by filing suit, it
waives immunity from suit for any claim that is "incident to, connected
with, arises out of, or is germane to the suit or controversy brought by the
State." 14
The Texas Supreme Court properly referred to and followed earlier
decisions in reaching this conclusion, including Anderson, Clayton & Co.




12. Id. at 409.
13. Id.
14. Id.; see Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. State, 62 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tex. 1939); State v.
Martin, 347 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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v. State15 and State v. Martin.16 In its discussion, the supreme court found
no reason to draw a distinction between a governmental entity as plaintiff
and a governmental entity that intervenes to seek affirmative relief.1 7 In
either case, a governmental entity would subject itself to the jurisdiction
of the court and waive immunity. 18
The Texas Supreme Court granted rehearing on the Reata case. Al-
though oral arguments have been completed, the supreme court has yet
to issue a subsequent opinion.
B. COURT OF APPEALS' DECISIONS ON WAIVER BY FILING SUIT
Both before and after Reata, various courts of appeal considered
waiver of immunity from suit through seeking affirmative relief. The
Texas courts of appeal consistently have held that, by filing claims for
affirmative relief, a public entity waives its claim of immunity from suit.
For example, before Reata, the Austin Court of Appeals, in State of
Texas v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland1 9 held that the State of
Texas waives sovereign immunity when, as a plaintiff, it files a case in
district court and the defendant files a compulsory counterclaim. 20 In Fi-
delity, the Texas Department of Transportation ("TxDOT") terminated
the original contractor on a TxDOT project. The surety, Fidelity and De-
posit Co., completed the project after TxDOT demanded it to do so
under the performance bond. Upon completion, TxDOT sued Fidelity,
seeking to recover additional project costs that TxDOT claimed it had
incurred. Fidelity counterclaimed for breach of the same contract. 21
The trial court denied the State's plea to the jurisdiction, finding that
the State had waived sovereign immunity from suit by filing the case in
district court.22 The trial court held that the State subjected itself to the
counterclaims that were related to or germane to its original claims.23 In
analyzing the issue, the court of appeals noted that a well-accepted excep-
tion to the sovereign immunity doctrine is waiver by filing a suit in district
court in which the state is the plaintiff.24 The court's language on this
issue was clear and forceful:
We acknowledge and reaffirm that it is the legislature's sole province
to waive or abrogate sovereign immunity. But just as Texas courts
have adhered to this general rule for over a century, they have also
recognized an exception to this rule-when the State initiates suit. It
is well established that the State's initiation of suit is an exception to
15. Anderson, 62 S.W.2d at 107.
16. Martin, 347 S.W.2d at 809.
17. Reata, 47 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 409.
18. Id. at 409-10.
19. 127 S.W.3d 339 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, pet. filed).
20. Id. at 347.
21. Id. at 341-42.
22. Id. at 341.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 343.
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sovereign immunity from suit clearly recognized by Texas courts. 25
The Fidelity court also relied on Justice Hecht's concurring opinion in
IT-Davy in reaching its holding.26 Further, the court rejected the State's
argument that it sued Fidelity as a surety, and Fidelity counterclaimed as
a completing contractor.27 The court said that argument was unpersua-
sive and that the claims and counterclaims were related to the parties'
additional expenses and costs incurred in connection with the project. 28
Finally, the Austin court held that the administrative process on Fidel-
ity, under Transportation Code section 201.112, was not a proper proce-
dure because the statute limited its application to highway projects.29
Because this was a building, not a highway project, section 201.112 did
not apply.30 As a result, the court concluded that Fidelity had no admin-
istrative remedy to exhaust. 31
After Reata, the Houston Court of Appeals in Ray Ferguson Interests,
Inc. v. Harris County Sports & Convention Corp.32 agreed that a counter-
claim filing waived the city's immunity from suit.33 The Harris County
Sports & Convention Corporation ("HCSCC") contracted with Ferguson
in 1999 to build parking lots and facilities at Reliant Stadium. After sub-
stantial completion of the project, problems occurred with some of the
structures. Ferguson alleged that HCSCC, its engineers, and its other
contractors were at fault for the problems. HCSCC demanded warranty
work and withheld $300,000 in retainage from Ferguson. Ferguson al-
leged that it expended over $400,000 in performing remedial work while
trying to negotiate a change order. Ferguson ceased work when the par-
ties could not reach any resolution. Ferguson sued HCSCC and others,
claiming breach of warranty, breach of contract, and negligence for fail-
ure to provide accurate and suitable plans and specifications. HCSCC
filed an answer and counterclaim for damages and then filed a plea to the
jurisdiction, which the trial court granted.34
Ferguson argued that HCSCC waived immunity from suit by asserting
the counterclaim for affirmative relief that arose out of and related to
Ferguson's claims. HCSCC argued its counterclaim did not waive immu-
nity because it was compulsory, not permissive. The court of appeals
found the facts analogous to the Reata case and applied its holding. 35
The court found that HCSCC's counterclaim did seek affirmative re-
lief, and it noted that:
25. Id.
26. Id. at 344.
27. Id. at 345.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 346.
30. Id. at 346-47; see TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 221.001 (West 1999).
31. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 127 S.W.3d at 346-47.
32. 169 S.W.3d 18 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet. h.).
33. Id. at 21.
34. Id. at 21-22.
35. Id. at 26.
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[t]o qualify as a claim for affirmative relief, a defensive pleading
must allege that the defendant has a cause of action, independent of
the plaintiff's claim, on which he could recover benefits, compensa-
tion or relief, even though the plaintiff may abandon his cause of
action or fail to establish it.36
Further, the Houston court concluded that the counterclaim was "inci-
dent to, connected with, [arose] out of, or [was] germane to" the matter in
controversy between HCSCC and Ferguson and to Ferguson's claims.37
Ferguson alleged that HCSCC breached the contract by failing to issue
change orders, direct work, pay retainage, and provide proper plans,
among other things. HCSCC's counterclaim arose from the same con-
tract and Ferguson's alleged failure to perform. 38
An earlier Dallas Court of Appeals opinion helped the court in deter-
mining that the term "germane" is not narrower in scope than the test for
a compulsory counterclaim. 39 It read the phrase "incident to, connected
with, arises out of, or is germane to" as including claims that "arise from
the same transaction" and that depend on facts pertinent to the parties'
conduct regarding the same transaction.40
Finally, the court determined that it was irrelevant that HCSCC filed a
counterclaim instead of intervening by filing a pleading like in Reata.41
The court concluded that, like an intervener, a party that asserts a coun-
terclaim for affirmative relief is asserting the type of claim that could be
brought in its own name if it filed its own suit.42 Accordingly, the court
concluded that the counterclaim did waive the city's immunity from
suit.43
The court also rejected HCSCC's argument that the counterclaim was
compulsory.44 It noted that if a governmental entity truly enjoys immu-
nity from a plaintiff's claims, then its failure to assert a compulsory coun-
terclaim for affirmative relief cannot have a preclusive effect that might
occur in other contexts. 45 Thus, when a court considers a plea to the ju-
risdiction based on a claim of immunity from suit, the court must consider
that it has no subject-matter jurisdiction and dismiss the case, if that as-
sertion is correct. 46 Under those circumstances, the governmental-entity
defendant need not assert any counterclaim because there is no plaintiff's
36. Id. at 25 (quoting Gen. Land Office v. OXY U.S.A., Inc. 789 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex.
1990)).
37. Id. at 25 (citing Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 47 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 408
(2004)).
38. Id. at 24.
39. Id. (citing City of Dallas v. Redbird Dev. Corp., 143 S.W.3d 375 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 2004, no pet. h.)).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 25.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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claim over which the court must exercise jurisdiction.47 On the other
hand, if the court determines that there is no immunity from suit for a
plaintiff's claim and denies a plea to the jurisdiction, the governmental
entity must then assert its compulsory counterclaims. 48 Accordingly, the
Houston court concluded that the defendant entity should file and seek a
ruling on its jurisdictional plea before filing any claims for affirmative
relief.49
After Reata, the Dallas Court of Appeals rendered its decision in City
of Grand Prairie v. Irwin Seating Co.50 In that case, the Linbeck/Con-
Real/Russell Joint Venture contracted with Texas NextStage to construct
a theater in Grand Prairie. During construction of the project, Texas
NextStage sold the property and improvements to the City of Grand Prai-
rie. When the contractor did not receive payment for the construction, it
first filed a mechanic's lien against the property and then filed a suit to
foreclose its lien, naming the City of Grand Prairie as a party as the cur-
rent owner of the property subject to the lien. Under the Property Code
and Texas Constitution, the lien rights related back to and incepted as of
the beginning of work on the project, well before the City of Grand Prai-
rie acquired it. Grand Prairie responded by filing an answer and then
obtaining a bond from RLI Insurance to indemnify the property against
the lien. The city then filed a counterclaim against the contractor for
damages, a declaratory judgment that the lien was invalid, and a third-
party petition for damages against new parties to the lawsuit. After filing
the counterclaim and third-party claims, Grand Prairie filed a plea to the
jurisdiction, arguing immunity from suit.51
The Dallas Court of Appeals noted that immunity from suit bars a law-
suit against a city unless the city expressly gives consent to the suit, which
may be given by statute, by legislative resolution, or by waiver through
filing suit.52 The City of Grand Prairie argued that it did not initiate any
legal proceedings that would result in a waiver of immunity from suit
because its counterclaim and third-party claims sought damages in any
amounts the city was found to owe the plaintiff. The Dallas court re-
jected the argument, citing Reata. "[B]y filing a suit for damages, a gov-
ernmental entity waives immunity from suit for any claim that is incident
to, connected with, arises out of, or is germane to the suit of controversy
brought by the State."'53
In its discussion, the court noted that it had previously held that a gov-




50. 170 S.W.3d 216, 220 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet. filed).
51. Id. at 217-18.
52. Id. at 218-19 (citing Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 47 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 408
(Tex. 2004) (per curiam)).
53. Id. at 219 (citing Reata, 47 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 408).
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intentional relinquishment of any claim to governmental immunity. '54 It
also reiterated the choice a public entity faces when sued: invoke the ju-
risdiction of the court by seeking affirmative relief or challenge the
court's subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute.55 Upon review of the
facts, the Dallas court concluded that the City of Grand Prairie invoked
the jurisdiction of the trial court by seeking affirmative relief in its coun-
terclaims and third-party claims. 56 The court also concluded that the
other parties' claims were incident to, connected with, arose out of, or
were germane to Grand Prairie's counterclaim.5 7 Finally, the court noted
that the city's counterclaim even stated that "jurisdiction and venue have
already been established in this Court, and [Grand Prairie's] claim [sic]
arise out of and are related to the claims at issue in this suit. ''58
Earlier, the Dallas Court of Appeals reached a similar decision in City
of Irving v. Inform Construction, Inc. 59 In this case, Inform Construction
contracted with the city to construct a recreation center and related site
work. Inform sued the city in 2002, alleging that it failed to meet its con-
tractual payment obligations. The city counterclaimed for damages for
Inform's alleged breach of the contract. 60
The city later filed a plea to the jurisdiction. The city argued that it did
not pursue its earlier request for affirmative relief when it filed a plea to
the jurisdiction, but the Dallas court noted that it did not amend its an-
swer or withdraw the counterclaim.6' The city also objected to Inform's
argument on appeal, for the first time, that the city's counterclaim was a
waiver of immunity under the later-decided Reata decision. The Dallas
Court of Appeals held that Inform was merely noting an additional rea-
son why the trial judge correctly decided that the court had subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction, and that the court of appeals makes a de novo review of
the trial court's ruling when the issue is one of law.62 The Dallas court
further noted that it is required to follow the state supreme court's ex-
pression of the law.63
In reviewing the facts of Inform's case, the Dallas court noted that the
city's counterclaim requested affirmative relief in the form of breach-of-
contract damages. 64 The Dallas court concluded that there was no dis-
tinction between an affirmative claim for relief filed by a third-party de-
54. Id. (citing City of Dallas v. Martin, 140 S.W.3d 924, 925 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004,
no pet. h.); City of Dallas v. Bargman, No. 05-04-00316-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 8858, at
*3 (Tex. App.-Dallas Oct. 5, 2004, no pet. h.); City of Irving v. Inform Constr., Inc., 143
S.W.3d 371, 373 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. filed)).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 220.
58. Id.
59. 143 S.W.3d 371, 373 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. filed).
60, Id. at 372-73.
61. Id. at 371.
62. Id. at 373-74.
63. Id. at 373.
64. Id. at 374.
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fendant (as in Reata) and a defendant, as in the present case. 6 5 Thus, the
Dallas court concluded that the City of Irving waived its claim of immu-
nity by filing a counterclaim for damages.6 6
The Beaumont Court of Appeals followed Reata in Port Neches-Groves
Independent School District v. Pyramid Constructors, L.L.P.67 In that
case, Pyramid Constructors sued the school district for breach of contract.
The district then filed a counterclaim for breach of contract. The parties
settled various claims between themselves, but they agreed that Pyramid
would retain all causes of action for retainage withheld under the con-
tract. Pyramid dismissed its claims with prejudice, except for those relat-
ing to retainage. At that point, the school district filed a plea to the
jurisdiction, arguing that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction
to hear the case based on immunity from suit.68
The Beaumont Court of Appeals concluded that the school district
waived immunity from suit by filing its counterclaim. 69 It noted that the
district could have asserted immunity without filing a counterclaim to
seek affirmative relief.70 Because it filed the counterclaim, however, the
district waived immunity from suit.7 1
These courts of appeals' decisions illustrate uniformity in following Re-
ata among courts addressing waiver by filing suit.
C. WAIVER THROUGH "SUE AND BE SUED" LANGUAGE IN
GOVERNMENT CODE AND CITY CHARTER
In addition to finding waiver by filing claims, many Texas courts of ap-
peal continued to find waiver as a result of the "sue and be sued" and
"plead and be impleaded" language included in the Texas Local Govern-
ment Code and the various city charters.
For example, in Utility Contractors of America, Inc. v. City of Canyon,72
the Amarillo Court of Appeals concluded that the "sue and be sued"
language in the Local Government Code and the Canyon City Charter
waived immunity from suit.73 In that case, the City of Canyon contracted
with Utility Contractors of America, Inc. for the design of a municipal-
water and sewer-lines extension. Utility completed the project late but
claimed that deficiencies in the information provided caused the delay.
Utility then sought payment for additional work required for completion.
The city denied the claims. Utility filed suit against the city for breach of
contract and negligence. The city asserted governmental immunity, but
65. Id. at 375.
66. Id.
67. 140 S.W.3d 440, 444 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, pet. filed).
68. Id. at 441-42.
69. Id. at 443.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. No. 07-03-0075-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 4038, at *7 (Tex. App.-Amarillo May
24, 2005, no pet. h.) (mem op.).
73. Id. at *7-8.
2006] 1089
SMU LAW REVIEW
also filed a counterclaim against Utility for breach of contract. The trial
court granted the plea in abatement as to the plaintiff's tort claims and
later granted a plea to the jurisdiction for the contract claims.7 4
Utility later filed a motion for new trial, arguing that the city waived
immunity by accepting benefits under the contract. The city filed a non-
suit of its counterclaim against the plaintiff. The trial court overruled the
motion for new trial.75
On appeal, Utility argued that section 51.075 of the Local Government
Code waived the city's immunity from suit by providing that a municipal-
ity "may plead and be impleaded in any court," and that the city charter
waived immunity by stating that the city "may sue and be sued, may con-
tract and be contracted with; [and] may implead and be impleaded in all
courts having jurisdiction of the subject matter involved. '76 The court,
relying on a 2004 decision, again concluded that the language in the Local
Government Code and city charter clearly and unambiguously waived the
city's immunity from suit.77 The court also noted that the city's filing of a
counterclaim constituted a waiver of immunity from suit.78
Similarly, the Houston Court of Appeals for the First District agreed
that the language in the Local Government Code and the applicable city
charter waived immunity from suit. In United Water Services, Inc. v. City
of Houston,79 United Water Services contracted with the City of Houston
to operate and maintain a water-purification plant. The city refused to
pay United for services under the contract, arguing that United breached
its obligations. The city also submitted a claim on the performance bond
to Continental Insurance Company, asserting that United's breach caused
damage to the city.80
United filed suit against the city, seeking damages for breach of con-
tract and a declaratory judgment that it did not breach the agreement.
The City of Houston filed a counterclaim against United and a separate
suit against the insurer in federal court. The city then filed a plea to the
jurisdiction, asserting that it was immune from suit in the state court.
United argued that Local Government Code section 51.075 waived im-
munity from suit. United also argued that the city waived immunity from
suit by filing its counterclaim and federal-court action.81
With regard to the charter's "sue and be sued" language, the court con-
cluded that the Texas Supreme Court determined in Missouri Pacific Rail-
road Co. v. Brownsville Navigation District82 that such language waived
74. Id. at *1-4.
75. Id. at *4.
76. Id. at *7 (citing TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE § 51.075 (Vernon 1999) and CANYON CITY
CHARTER art. III, § 3.01(a)).
77. Id. at *7 (citing City of Lubbock v. Adams, 149 S.W.3d 820 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
2004, pet. filed)).
78. Id. at *9.
79. 137 S.W.3d 747, 758 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. filed).
80. Id. at 749.
81. Id.
82. 453 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1970).
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immunity from suit and that it was bound by that precedent. 83 The court
also analyzed the city charter at some length, concluding that the "sue
and be sued" language in it was a clear and unambiguous waiver of the
city's immunity from suit.84 It acknowledged the existence of contrary
decisions in other courts, but refused to follow them.8 5
The Houston Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District reached a
similar conclusion in City of Houston v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc.86
That court concluded that it would not draw a distinction between the
"sue and be sued" language and the "plead and be impleaded" language,
and that both clearly and unambiguously waived a city's immunity from
suit.87
The Eastland Court of Appeals found that Government Code section
392.065 waived a housing authority's sovereign immunity from suit in
Gene Duke Builders, Inc. v. Abilene Housing Authority.88 The contractor
and housing authority in that case entered into a construction contract to
repair housing units. The parties disputed issues relating to completion
and payment with one another.89 Relying on the reasoning in Missouri
Pacific, the court of appeals determined that section 392.065, which al-
lows a housing authority to "sue and be sued," waived the housing au-
thority's sovereign immunity from suit.90
In addition, the court concluded that the administrative provisions in
section 2260 of the Texas Government Code would not apply to the dis-
pute because there was no authority to establish that the housing author-
ity was a "unit of state government." 91 The court held that nothing in
section 2260 defined the housing authority as a unit of state government,
and the authority did not fall within the statute's catch-all categories. 92
Finally, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals concluded that the lan-
guage of the Government Code and city charter waived the City of Al-
ton's sovereign immunity from suit in City of Alton v. Sharyland Water
Supply Corp.93 In that case, the court determined that immunity from
suit did not bar breach-of-contract claims asserted against the city for the
same reasons cited by the various courts of appeal discussed above. 94
83. United Water Servs., 137 S.W.3d at 751.
84. Id. at 757.
85. Id. at 758 n.14.
86. 161 S.W.3d 3, 18 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. granted).
87. Id. at 8.
88. 168 S.W.3d 215, 223 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2005, pet. filed).
89. Id. at 217.
90. Id. at 218.
91. Id. at 219.
92. Id.




D. WAIVER THROUGH "SUE AND BE SUED" LANGUAGE
IN EDUCATION CODE
The Texas courts of appeal looked at statutes in addition to the Texas
Local Government Code in analyzing the "sue and be sued" language
during 2004 and 2005. Three cases analyzed the Texas Education Code
and determined that waiver of immunity from suit occurred as a result of
the "sue and be sued" language in that statute.
In Alamo Community College District v. Browning Construction Co.,95
the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that a junior college district
waived immunity from suit through a state charter. 96 Browning Con-
struction and the Alamo district contracted for the construction of a new
Alamo campus. Browning sued Alamo for breach of contract. Alamo
filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing sovereign immunity from suit.97
The court quickly disposed of Alamo's argument, noting that it has spe-
cifically held that junior-college community districts are not immune from
suit:
ACCD is a junior college community district organized pursuant to
chapter 130 of the Texas Education Code. Under chapter 130,
ACCD's board of trustees' "powers and duties" "in the ... manage-
ment and control of the junior college" are governed by "the general
law governing the . . . management and control of independent
school districts insofar as the general law is applicable." Part of the
"general law" governing the management and control of indepen-
dent school districts is the Texas Legislature's consent to suits against
"[t]he trustees of an independent school district ... in the name of
the district . .. ."
... By subjecting junior college districts like ACCD to the same gen-
eral law applicable to independent school districts, it appears to us,
clearly and unambiguously, the Texas Legislature granted its consent
to sue junior college community districts and we so hold.98
The court further noted that the basis of its conclusion in an earlier
case, as well as in the Browning case, was the Texas Supreme Court's
holding in Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Brownsville Navigation Dis-
trict.99 In that case, the supreme court concluded that the language of a
1925 statute clearly and unambiguously waived the Navigation District's
immunity from suit in stating that "[a]ll navigation districts established
under this Act may ... sue and be sued in all courts of this State in the
name of such navigation district."'100
The court noted that the Education Code similarly provided that the
95. 131 S.W.3d 146 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, pet. dism'd).
96. Id. at 155.
97. Id. at 150-51.
98. Id. at 151-52 (quoting Alamo Cmty. Coll. Dist. v. Obayashi Corp., 980 S.W.2d 745,
747-48 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied)).
99. 453 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1970).
100. Id. at 813.
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trustees of an independent school district may sue and be sued. 1°1 Based
on that language, which the court found unambiguous, the court con-
cluded that the district had waived any immunity from suit.1
0 2
The court of appeals rejected the district's argument that the IT-Davy
case suggested there was immunity from suit.10 3 The court distinguished
the holding in that case, which focused on waiver by accepting benefits
under a contract.'0 4 The court also noted a Dallas Court of Appeals'
decision that found no waiver of immunity for school districts because of
the Education Code's language, but it declined to follow that case, noting
its inconsistency with the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Missouri
Pacific.105
In Longview Independent School District v. Vibra-Whirl, Ltd.10 6 the
Texarkana Court of Appeals also concluded that the Education Code
waives immunity from suit for a Texas school district.10 7 In that case,
Vibra-Whirl contracted with the school district to install a synthetic-turf
football field. The school district refused to pay Vibra-Whirl after a con-
tract dispute. Vibra-Whirl filed suit, and the district asserted a plea to the
jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the
plea.108
On appeal, Vibra-Whirl argued that Texas Education Code section
11.151 waived the district's immunity from suit in its "sue and be sued"
language. The court noted the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Mis-
souri Pacific, which found a waiver, as well as cases finding no waiver.109
After analyzing these authorities, the court determined that it was bound
to follow the Texas Supreme Court's precedent and concluded that the
"sue and be sued" language did effect a waiver of immunity from suit.' 10
Finally, in Lamesa Independent School District v. Booe,a1 ' the Eastland
Court of Appeals concluded that the Texas Education Code waived a
school district's immunity from suit. 112 Booe Roofing Company con-
tracted with the school district to provide roof installation and repair ser-
vices. Booe alleged that the school district refused to pay for work
performed and filed suit, asserting an implied contract or a right to re-
cover under quantum meruit. The school district filed a plea to the juris-
diction, arguing immunity from suit. The trial court denied the plea,
101. Browning, 131 S.W.3d at 152 (citing TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.151(a) (Vernon
1996)).
102. Id. at 154.
103. Id. at 152-53.
104. Id. at 153.
105. Id. at 154 (declining to follow Satterfield & Pontikes Constr., Inc. v. Irving Indep.
Sch. Dist., 123 S.W.3d 63 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet. granted)).
106. 169 S.W.3d 511 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, no pet. h.).
107. Id. at 514.
108. Id. at 513.
109. Id. at 514.
110. Id.
111. No. 11-03-00394-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 7137 (Tex. App.-Eastand Aug. 31,
2005, pet. filed).
112. Id. at *1.
109320061
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finding that the Texas Education Code waived sovereign immunity and
that the school district waived immunity through its conduct during the
work and litigation.1 1 3 The court of appeals affirmed on the first
ground.114
The Eastland court held that the "sue and be sued" language in the
Education Code plainly gives general consent for a governmental entity
to be sued, citing the Missouri Pacific holding.115 The court also noted
that legislation passed in 2005 expressly waives immunity from suit for
local governmental entities, including school districts, that enter into
goods and services contracts." 6 Accordingly, the court concluded that
the district clearly and unambiguously waived immunity from suit.117
E. WAIVER THROUGH "SUE AND BE SUED" LANGUAGE
IN TRANSPORTATION CODE
In Metropolitan Transit Authority v. MEB Engineering, Inc.,118 the
Houston Court of Appeals for the First District concluded that the "sue
and be sued" language of the Texas Transportation Code waived a transit
authority's immunity from suit.' 19 Metropolitan Transit Authority
("Metro") entered into three construction contracts with MEB Engineer-
ing. MEB alleged that it performed extra work for Metro and suffered
delays as a result of Metro's failure to plan. MEB sued Metro for breach
of contract, quantum meruit, and fraud. Metro filed a counterclaim, alleg-
ing that it was entitled to liquidated damages from MEB. It then filed a
plea to the jurisdiction, asserting that it was immune from suit as a gov-
ernmental unit. MEB responded that the "sue and be sued" language of
Texas Transportation Code section 451.054 waived immunity from suit.
The trial court denied Metro's plea to the jurisdiction on the breach-of-
contract claim.1 20
The court of appeals analyzed section 451's language that the authority
"may sue and be sued.' 12 1 Citing Missouri Pacific, the court concluded
that the Texas Supreme Court determined that the "sue and be sued"
language was a waiver of immunity from suit. 12 2 Accordingly, the court
concluded that section 451.054 clearly and unambiguously waived
Metro's immunity from suit.123
113. Id. at *1-2.
114. Id. at *6-7.
115. Id. at *4.
116. Id. at *6.
117. Id. at *6-7.
118. 176 S.W.3d 300 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. filed).
119. Id. at 304.
120. Id. at 301-02.
121. Id. at 302-03.
122. Id. at 303-04.
123. Id. at 304.
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F. No WAIVER THROUGH "SUE AND BE SUED" LANGUAGE
During 2004 and 2005, the Dallas Court of Appeals stood in contrast to
the various other courts of appeal that analyzed the "sue and be sued"
language in the construction context. In three separate decisions, the
Dallas Court of Appeals refused to find a waiver of immunity from suit as
a result of statutory and charter language.
In 2005, in City of Greenville v. Reeves,124 the Dallas Court of Appeals
held that the language in the Texas Government Code and city charter
did not clearly and unambiguously waive immunity from suit.12 5 A con-
tractor who provided labor and materials to construct a fire station sued
the City of Greenville for failure to pay for work and materials. The city
answered and filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting immunity from
suit. 126
The contractor argued that Texas Local Government Code section
51.075 waived the city's immunity from suit in its language that a home-
rule municipality "may plead and be impleaded in any court. ' 127 The
Dallas court, which had previously ruled that section 51.075 is not a clear
and unambiguous waiver of a city's immunity from suit, reviewed four
factors established by the Texas Supreme Court to determine whether the
legislature clearly waived immunity: (1) the statute waives immunity be-
yond doubt; (2) ambiguities are resolved in favor of retaining immunity;
(3) if the legislature requires the state be joined in a lawsuit in which
immunity would otherwise attach, the legislature has intentionally waived
the state's sovereign immunity; and (4) the statue also provides an objec-
tive limitation on the state's potential liability.
128
In its decision, the Dallas Court of Appeals noted its prior decisions in
which it concluded that section 51.075 is not meaningless without waiver
of immunity because it could refer to a city's capacity to litigate when it
waives immunity.129 Because the supreme court had not held that the
phrase "plead and implead" was a clear and unambiguous waiver of im-
munity from suit, the court refused to reverse its prior position on waiver
and concluded that the city did not waive immunity from suit.' 30 The
court similarly concluded that the city charter's words "sue and be sued"
and "plead and be impleaded in all courts" did not waive immunity from
suit. 131
Similarly, the Dallas Court of Appeals refused to find waiver in the
Government Code and city charter in City of Greenville v. Sisk Utilities,
124. 165 S.W.3d 920 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied).
125. Id. at 928.
126. Id. at 921.
127. Id. at 922.
128. Id. at 922 (citing Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 697-98 (Tex.
2003)).
129. Id. at 925.




Inc.132 Sisk Utilities agreed to perform sewer system work for the City of
Greenville. Sisk alleged that the city's improperly performed work
caused damages to Sisk. Sisk filed suit against the city, claiming it waived
immunity from suit in the Government Code and the city charter. 133
Consistent with its prior rulings, the Dallas court refused to find an unam-
biguous waiver in the statute and city charter.1 34
In 2004, the Dallas Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in
City of Carrollton v. McMahon Contracting, LP.135 In that case, the City
of Carrollton and McMahon Contracting entered into a contract for
street repairs. McMahon sued the city for breach of contract when a pay-
ment dispute arose. The city filed a plea to the jurisdiction on the
grounds that it enjoyed immunity from suit. The trial court denied the
plea, and the city appealed. 13 6
The court of appeals reversed, holding that section 51.075 of the Texas
Local Government Code did not clearly and unambiguously waive the
city's immunity from suit. 137 McMahon pointed to section 51.075's provi-
sion that a home-rule municipality "may plead and be impleaded in any
court" to show that there was no immunity from suit. 138 The court fol-
lowed the Waco Court of Appeals holding in City of Mexia v. Tooke13 9
and concluded that "plead and be impleaded" is not a clear waiver of
immunity.140 The court held that section 51.075 was ambiguous as to
whether it addresses a home-rule city's capacity to plead and be im-
pleaded as an entity, or whether it waives immunity from suit. 14 1 The
court noted but declined to follow the Houston and Fort Worth courts
that held that such language did constitute a clear waiver of immunity
from suit.' 42
G. No WAIVER UNDER TORT CLAIMS ACT FOR
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION
In City of Mesquite v. PKG Contracting, Inc.,143 the Dallas Court of
Appeals held that a city's governmental functions included overseeing
storm sewers and that no waiver for a tort action existed under the Texas
Tort Claims Act in the context of such a function.' 44 The City of Mes-
quite contracted with PKG Contracting for construction of a storm drain-
132. 164 S.W.3d 931, 933 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet. granted).
133. Id. at 932.
134. Id. at 933.
135. 134 S.W.3d 925, 928 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. granted).
136. Id. at 926.
137. Id. at 928.
138. Id. at 927.
139. Id.; see City of Mexia v. Tooke, 115 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex. App.-Waco 2003, pet.
granted).
140. McMahon Contracting, 134 S.W.3d at 927-28.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 928.
143. 148 S.W.3d 209 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. granted).
144. Id. at 213.
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age system. During construction, the parties disputed which party was
responsible for moving certain utilities from the right-of-way. PKG filed
suit against the city, who then filed a plea to the jurisdiction, affirmative
defenses, and a general denial. PKG amended its petition to allege that
the city had no immunity when it engaged in a proprietary function and
that it waived any immunity from suit and liability, citing the city charter
and the Local Government Code.145
The court noted that a governmental unit is immune from tort liability
unless the legislature has waived immunity and that waiver does not ap-
ply to liability for damages arising from an entity's governmental func-
tions under the Texas Tort Claims Act. 146 PKG asserted that the city had
no immunity when it acted in its proprietary capacity and contracted as a
private citizen.
The court referenced section 101.0215 of the Tort Claims Act to deter-
mine the governmental versus proprietary functions of a city. 147 The
court noted that among the list of governmental functions was oversight
of "sanitary and storm sewers."'1 48 Accordingly, it concluded that the
contract work was a governmental function and that the Tort Claims Act
did not waive immunity from suit for the city. 149 The court refused
PKG's argument that it should look to the Tort Claims Act to determine
waiver but ignore the Act when determining what was a governmental
function.1 50 As a final point, the court refused to find waiver through the
city charter or through the Texas Local Government Code section
51.075.151
The Dallas Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in Bell v.
City of Dallas.152 In that case, the Bells purchased a residential lot in
Dallas and built a home and pool on it. The lot was subject to an ease-
ment for drainage sewers and two storm drains were located on the ease-
ment. The Bells began to notice cracks in their pool. Later, the city
began a project to improve the storm-drainage system, and it hired a con-
tractor to perform work on that project. The Bells alleged that the con-
tractor caused additional damage to their pool, so they sued the city and
the contractor for negligence and other claims. 153
The city filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting governmental immu-
nity. The court determined that storm-sewer maintenance was a govern-
mental function, citing the Tort Claims Act. 154 The Bells argued that
145. Id. at 211.
146. Id. at 212 (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. ch. 101 (Vernon 1997 &
Supp. 2004)).




151. Id. at 213-14.
152. 146 S.W.3d 819 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.).
153. Id. at 821-23.




even if the maintenance and operation were governmental functions, the
city's alleged promise to fix the drain problems was not. The court re-
jected the attempt to plead around the Tort Claims Act, concluding that
all complained-of actions were governmental functions. 155
H. IMMUNITY FOR CONTRACTORS HIRED BY
GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES
In GLF Construction Corp. v. LAN/STV, 156 the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, applying Texas law, held that a company performing work on
behalf of a public entity was entitled to limited immunity, just as the pub-
lic entity would have enjoyed.157 LAN/STV entered into a contract with
the Dallas Area Rapid Transit ("DART") to prepare plans, drawings, and
specifications for the construction of an extension to Dallas's light-rail
system. The engineering contract also required LAN/STV to provide ad-
ministrative and supervisory services for the project. DART provided the
plans to general contractors, who then submitted bids to DART for the
construction contract. The contract was awarded to GLF. By virtue of
the contracts, DART was in privity with LAN/STV and GLF, but those
two entities were not in privity with one another. 158
GLF filed suit against LAN/STV for tort claims of professional negli-
gence. Lacking privity with LAN/STV, it could not assert breach of con-
tract. LAN/STV filed a motion asserting derivative sovereign immunity.
It alleged that, as an independent contractor performing DART's func-
tions, it had the same immunity for tort claims as DART would have. 159
The Fifth Circuit cited Texas law that if "an independent contractor of
[a transportation] entity is performing a function of the entity or of a
regional transportation authority..., the contractor is liable for damages
only to the extent that the entity or authority would be liable if the entity
or authority itself were performing the function."' 160 GLF did not dispute
that LAN/STV's engineering and supervisory services did fall within
DART's functions as a regional authority. Accordingly, the court found
that LAN/STY would be liable for damages to GLF "only to the extent"
that DART would be liable had it performed the work itself.' 6 1
The court then turned to whether DART's sovereign immunity would
apply in a tort claim and found that the Texas Tort Claims Act would bar
such claims.' 62 The court noted that Texas law limits DART's liability
both in causes of action for which it may be held liable and in the maxi-
155. Id.
156. 414 F.3d 553 (5th Cir. 2005).
157. Id. at 557.
158. Id. at 555.
159. Id.
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mum amount of recovery. 163 Accordingly, the court concluded that the
Act's limitations would apply to LAN/STV and that LAN/STV enjoyed
immunity from suit to the extent provided in that statute.
164
By contrast, in City of Alton v. Sharyland Water Supply Corp.,16 5 the
Corpus Christi Court of Appeals rejected the defendant contractor's con-
tention that it was entitled to immunity from suit.166 In that case, the
contractor cited no authority for its derivative immunity claim.
167
I. WAIVER AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
In Martin K. Eby Construction Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit,'68 the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals required exhaustion of administrative rem-
edies in a construction contract, regardless of whether a public entity
waives immunity from suit in a statute or otherwise. Eby and DART en-
tered into a construction contract for a section of DART's light-rail sys-
tem near downtown Dallas. Eby filed suit against DART, alleging breach
of contract and misrepresentation. DART filed a motion to dismiss, argu-
ing that the complaint failed to state a claim for which relief could be
granted because Eby did not exhaust its administrative remedies and be-
cause the misrepresentation claim would be barred by governmental im-
munity and the Tort Claims Act.169
The contract between the parties contained a specific provision requir-
ing all bidders to agree to exhaust all administrative remedies under
DART's procurement regulations or the resulting contract's disputes
clause. Eby did not submit its claims to the contract's administrative pro-
cess, but instead alleged that it did complain to DART regarding work
problems it faced. The district court granted DART's motion to dismiss
both claims. 170
The court noted that the Texas courts generally require a party to ex-
haust its administrative remedies before seeking judicial review.1 7 1 Eby
argued that DART's procedures, which were found only in its procure-
ment regulations and the contract, rather than in a statute, were not bind-
ing. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, determining that the Texas Supreme
Court, if faced with the question, would require the exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies before litigation. 172
The court also discussed waiver, noting that by contracting with Eby,
DART had waived immunity from liability. 173 The court noted the divi-
sion among the Texas courts of appeal on the question of whether the
163. Id.
164. Id. at 557.
165. 145 S.W.3d 673 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, pet. denied).
166. Id. at 682.
167. Id.
168. 369 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 2004).
169. Id. at 465-67.
170. Id. at 467.
171. Id.




"sue and be sued" language in various statutes waives immunity from
suit.' 74 The Fifth Circuit determined the that question was irrelevant to
the case because, even if DART lacked governmental immunity, Eby
would still be required to exhaust the administrative remedies.' 75 The
court noted that the legislature waiving DART's governmental immunity
did not give contractors permission "to sue DART without first submit-
ting their claims to the statutorily authorized administrative process. '176
The court also disagreed with Eby's argument that, if DART materially
breached the contract, that breach would excuse Eby's obligation to sub-
mit to the administrative process. 177
III. PASS-THROUGH CLAIMS
Before 2004, the Texas courts had not determined whether a contractor
liable to a subcontractor for damages that the subcontractor sustained
while performing a construction contract could bring a so-called "pass-
through claim" against an owner. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals cer-
tified that question to the Texas Supreme Court, and both the supreme
court and various federal and state courts had the opportunity to discuss
those issues during 2004 and 2005.
A. THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT'S RULE ON PASS-THROUGH CLAIMS
In Interstate Contracting Corp. v. City of Dallas,178 the Fifth Circuit cer-
tified to the Texas Supreme Court questions related to "pass-through"
claims to determine Texas law on such issues.179 In the case before the
Fifth Circuit, the City of Dallas contracted with Interstate Contracting
Corporation ("ICC") on a fixed-sum basis for levee construction around
a water-treatment plant and related work. ICC formed two subcontracts
with Mine Services, Inc. ("MSI") for some of the work. MSI mixed sand
and clay to manufacture work material, which substantially increased the
job costs. The contract was silent as to manufacturing fill material. ICC
informed the city of MSI's increased work, but the city indicated that it
would deny any additional-compensation claim because the work went
beyond the scope of the contract. The contract between ICC and MSI
gave ICC the sole discretion to bring a claim against the city on MSI's
behalf at MSI's expense. Pursuant thereto, ICC filed suit against the city
on behalf of MSI. 180
The District Court for the Northern District of Texas allowed ICC to
bring the claims. On appeal, the city argued that the judgment was in
error because there was no privity between the subcontractor and city.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 468-69.
176. Id. at 469.
177. Id. 470-71.
178. 320 F.3d 539 (5th Cir. 2003).
179. Id. at 540.
180. Id. at 540-43.
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ICC argued that, despite a lack of privity, the court correctly permitted
ICC to present MSI's claims on a pass-through basis. While the court
found support for pass-through claims in actions against the federal gov-
ernment, it found no Texas authority for claims against a state entity.181
Accordingly, the court of appeals asked the Texas Supreme Court to de-
termine if Texas law recognizes pass-through claims; that is, "may a con-
tractor assert a claim on behalf of its subcontractor against the owner
when there is no privity of contract between the subcontractor and the
owner?"182
In Interstate Contracting Corp. v. City of Dallas,183 the Texas Supreme
Court answered two certified questions: (1) whether Texas recognizes
pass-through claims, and (2) what requirements must be satisfied in order
for a general contractor to assert claims for a subcontractor.184 As part of
its discussion, the supreme court noted that these were difficult issues of
first impression for the court, but emphasized privity of contract as a nec-
essary predicate for suit. 85 It concluded that the notions of privity and
pass-through claims were compatible and that the court would join the
majority of state and federal jurisdictions that permit pass-through
claims. 186
The supreme court defined a pass-through claim as a claim (1) by a
party that has suffered damages (in this case, a subcontractor); (2) against
a responsible party with which it has no contract (here, a city); and (3)
presented through an intervening party (here, the contractor) that has a
contractual relationship with both.187 Rather than have two lawsuits (one
by the subcontractor against the contractor and a second by the contrac-
tor against the owner), a pass-through claim permits a contractor to pur-
sue the subcontractor's claims directly against the owner. 188
In its discussion, the supreme court recognized that, under a typical
pass-through arrangement (commonly referred to in the construction in-
dustry as a liquidation agreement), a contractor acknowledges liability to
a subcontractor, which provides the general contractor with a basis for
action against an owner. 189 The contractor's liability is "liquidated" to
the extent of its recovery against the owner, and the contractor agrees to
convey all or some of its recovery to its subcontractor. 190 In addition, a
subcontractor releases all claims it may have against a contractor in ex-
change for the contractor's promise to pursue the claims against the
owner.
191
181. Id. at 544.
182. Id. at 545.
183. 135 S.W.3d 605 (Tex. 2004).
184. Id. at 607.
185. Id.
186. Id.







The court also discussed the limitation that a subcontractor generally
cannot recover from an owner without privity of contract.' 92 The court
concluded that a contractor should be allowed to recover costs from the
owner regardless of whether the contractor or the subcontractor per-
formed the work.193 Otherwise, an owner might receive a windfall simply
because of a lack of privity with the subcontractor in question.194 The
court also listed three policy justifications that shaped its decision: (1)
recognition of pass-through claims aligns Texas with federal procedure
and most states that have considered the issue; (2) pass-through claims
protect subcontractors from an owner's breach without undue prejudice
to the owner; and (3) pass-through claims promote judicial economy by
eliminating unnecessarily duplicative litigation and by encouraging full
settlement of claims.' 95
With regard to the second question, the supreme court concluded that
to support a pass-through claim, the agreement must provide that the
contractor remains liable to the subcontractor for its damages. 196 If the
owner disputes that liability continues, the owner bears the burden of
proving, as an affirmative defense, that the pass-through arrangement
eliminates the contractor's responsibility for the subcontractor's
damages.197
As a final point, the supreme court held that a contractor need not
admit liability in a binding settlement agreement to support a pass-
through claim. 19 Rather, liquidation agreements can be contained in a
subcontract or any contract, as long as it provides that the contractor has
continuing liability. 199 The court also permitted the agreement to include
a "pay if paid" provision, stating that the contractor has no obligation to
pay the subcontractor unless and until it recovers from the owner.200
B. FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS' DECISIONS
ON PASS-THROUGH CLAIMS
Both before and after the Texas Supreme Court's answers to the certi-
fied questions, various federal courts and Texas courts of appeal ad-
dressed pass-through claims.
In 2005, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas permitted a contractor to assert claims for a subcontractor against
the Dallas/Fort Worth Airport Board in Hensel Phelps Construction Co.
v. Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport Board.201 In that case, the
192. Id. at 610-11.
193. Id. at 616.
194. Id. at 618.
195. Id. at 619.
196. Id.




201. No. 3:03-CV-3043-D, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12290 (N.D. Tex. June 22, 2005)
(mem. op.).
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court concluded that a contractor liable to a subcontractor for damages
that the subcontractor sustained can sue an owner for the subcontractor's
damages under a pass-through agreement.20 2 The court went further,
holding that when a governmental entity/owner waives immunity from
liability by entering into a construction contract with a general contractor,
it also waives immunity from liability for all pass-through claims that the
contractor may lawfully assert under the contract. 20 3
Before the Texas Supreme Court's decision in 2004, the San Antonio
Court of Appeals also permitted pass-through claims. In Alamo Commu-
nity College District v. Browning Construction Co.,204 the court noted that
federal law and other states' laws permit pass-through claims, specifically
quoting the United States Supreme Court on its rationale:
Clearly the subcontractor could not recover this claim in a suit
against the United States, for there was no express or implied con-
tract between him and the Government. But it does not follow that
[the contractor] was the only person legally bound to perform his
contract with the Government and he had the undoubted right to
recover from the Government the contract price for the tile, ter-
razzo, marble and soapstone work whether that work was performed
personally or through another. This necessarily implies the right to
recover extra costs and services wrongfully demanded of [the con-
tractor] under the contract, regardless of whether such costs were
incurred or such services were performed personally or through a
subcontractor. [The contractor's] contract with the Government is
thus sufficient to sustain an action for extra costs wrongfully de-
manded under that contract.20 5
In addition, while noting that no Texas case had specifically dealt with
pass-through claims, the San Antonio court concluded that such claims
were not inconsistent with Texas law.20 6
IV. CLAIMS ON PERFORMANCE BONDS
AND PAYMENT BONDS
During 2004 and 2005, Texas courts considered a variety of questions
concerning performance bonds and payment bonds. The Texas Supreme
Court reiterated and emphasized its holding that suretyship is not insur-
ance, when it rejected a claim asserted under the Texas Insurance Code
against a surety. Other decisions focused on the scope of bonds provided,
202. Id. at *13-15.
203. Id. at *13-14.
204. 131 S.W.3d 146 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, pet. dism'd).
205. Id. at 159 (quoting United States v. Blair, 321 U.S. 730, 737-38 (1944)).
206. Id. (citing N. Harris County Junior Coll. Dist. v. Fleetwood Constr. Co., 604
S.W.2d 247, 255 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that
a contractor could recover for damages related to subcontracted work); H.B. Zachry Co. v.
Ceco Steel Prods. Corp., 404 S.W.2d 113, 116 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1966, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (holding that a contractor has exclusive right and duty to assert the same claim for
its subcontractor that it would have asserted for itself had it elected to do the work)).
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the compliance with the Texas Property Code, proper notice, material
change and discharge, and subrogration and indemnity rights.
A. SURETY BUSINESS Is NOT INSURANCE AND ARTICLE 21.21
DOES NOT APPLY
In Dallas Fire Insurance Co. v. Texas Contractors Surety & Casualty
Agency,20 7 the Texas Supreme Court again held that the business of sure-
tyship is not the same as the business of insurance, consistent with its
holding in Great American Insurance Co. v. North Austin Utility District
No. 1.208 In addition, the supreme court made it clear that Article 21.21
of the Texas Insurance Code does not apply to any claims or suits involv-
ing the business of suretyship and that the exclusion is not limited strictly
to suits between sureties and their bondholders. 20 9 Under the facts of the
case, the supreme court concluded that individuals had no Article 21.21
bad-faith claim against either the surety or the insurance agency, because
the relationship arose from the business of suretyship and not the "busi-
ness of insurance. ''210
B. PROPER NOTICES ON A PAYMENT BOND
In Redland Insurance Co. v. Southwest Stainless, L.P.,211 the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals concluded that a subcontractor's notice of
amount due sent to a contractor by regular mail, rather than certified
mail, constituted substantial compliance with the notice requirements of
the McGregor Act and Government Code Chapter 2253. In that case,
Southwest Stainless was a subcontractor of S.L. Sibert on a construction
project for the City of Fort Worth. Redland Insurance Company issued
the payment bond required by Chapter 2253. Stainless provided project
materials, but Sibert did not pay for them and eventually declared bank-
ruptcy. In the interim, Stainless timely provided notice of its claim to the
surety, with a copy to the general contractor.
The court of appeals noted first that, as the McGregor Act is remedial
in nature, "it is to be given the most comprehensive and liberal construc-
tion possible," and that the Act's notice requirements are satisfied by
substantial performance. 212 Stainless provided testimony that notices of
the claim were sent to the contractor by first-class regular mail the same
date they were mailed to the surety. Referring to other state court deci-
sions, the court concluded that if substantial compliance with the required
information in the notice is satisfactory, then mailing the notice by first-
class regular mail, rather than certified mail, was also substantial compli-
207. 159 S.W.3d 895 (Tex. 2004).
208. 908 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. 1995).
209. Dallas Fire, 159 S.W.3d at 896-97.
210. Id.
211. 181 S.W.3d 509 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet. h.).
212. Id. at 512.
1104 [Vol. 59
Construction and Surety Law
ance and sufficient.213
C. SCOPE OF A BOND CLAIM
In Harrison, Walker & Harper, L.P. v. Federated Mutual Insurance
Co.,214 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals addressed material alteration of
a construction contract as a surety discharge and a contractor's standing
to sue on a subcontractor's performance bond. In that case, the White
Oak Independent School District hired Harrison, Walker & Harper
("HWH") as a general contractor and construction manager for con-
structing a new cafeteria. HWH hired A&H Electric as a subcontractor
for the project's electrical work. A&H obtained performance and pay-
ment bonds from Federated, as required by the subcontract. Later,
HWH agreed to change the original contract with the school district to
include construction of a new library as well. HWH then issued a change
order for its subcontract with A&H, adding electrical work for the library
in the amount of $59,000. A&H did not make any changes to its bonds or
purchase new bonds.215
A&H completed its work on the cafeteria, but defaulted on the library
work. HWH provided notice on the bond to Federated and made a
$32,000 demand on it. Federated requested documents to prove the
claim, but did not otherwise respond to the demand. HWH then filed
suit. Federated argued that HWH did not have standing to sue on the
bond, that Federated did not breach any bond obligations because A&H
had performed the work that was covered by the bond, and that the li-
brary was a material alteration of the contract.2 16 The trial court granted
summary judgment for Federated, and the court of appeals affirmed. 217
First, the court rejected HWH's argument that it was a third-party ben-
eficiary suing for breach of the bond, noting that a third party may en-
force and recover on a contract made between other parties "only if the
contracting parties intend to secure a benefit to that third party, and only
if the contracting parties entered into the contract directly for the third
party's benefit. ' 21 8 The court said it would not imply a third-party-bene-
ficiary contract by implication; the agreement must clearly intend to con-
fer a direct benefit to the third party.2 19
The court held that the bond was a contract between Federated, as
surety, and A&H, as principal, for the express benefit of the school dis-
trict, as owner.220 The face of the bond named the school district as the
owner to whom performance was due and did not mention HWH. Ac-
213. Id.
214. No. 2-03-048-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 2989 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Apr. 1,
2004, no pet.).
215. Id. at *2.
216. Id. at *3-4.
217. Id. at *2.
218. Id. at *4.
219. Id.
220. Id. at *6.
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cordingly, the terms of the bond made the school district a creditor bene-
ficiary, but did not make HWH any type of third-party beneficiary. 221
Therefore, the court concluded that HWH had no standing to sue on the
bond.222
Additionally, the court noted that the doctrine of strictissimi juris ap-
plies to a surety bond in order to prevent the extension a guarantor's
implied obligation beyond the original agreement. 223 When a creditor
and principal debtor vary in any material degree from the terms of their
contract, a new contract is formed and a guarantor is not bound to it.224
The court concluded that the bond applied to cafeteria work only, and
that the bond was discharged with the performance on the cafeteria. 2
25
The changes in the scope of work to include the library was a material
change and constituted a new contract, for which Federated was not
bound.226
D. COMPLIANCE WITH PROPERTY CODE
In Laughlin Environmental, Inc. v. Premier Towers, L.P.,2 2 7 Houston's
Fourteenth District Court of Appeals concluded that a payment bond
that did not satisfy the requirements of the Texas Property Code would
not protect real property from a lien asserted by a subcontractor. 228 JPF
Holdings, the property owner, contracted for $1.295 million with Vanco
Insulation Abatement for abatement work in Houston. Vanco, as princi-
pal, and United Pacific Insurance Company, as surety, executed the per-
formance and payment bonds for the project. Vanco's subcontractor,
Laughlin Environmental, alleged that it was not paid for its work. Laugh-
lin timely filed a lien affidavit asserting a mechanic's and materialman's
lien against the property. JPF conveyed the property to a new owner.
Laughlin sued the surety, JPF, and the new owner, seeking to recover on
the bond or foreclose the lien.229
The question presented to the court was whether the payment bond
satisfactorily complied with Texas Property Code section 53.211 and
therefore would protect against liens to the real property and the subse-
quent owner.230 The court noted that Texas is one of the few states with a
statutory form of payment bond for a private contract. 231 The court re-
cited that such a bond must meet the criteria set forth in section 53.202 of
the Property Code, be approved by the owner, and be filed in accordance
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at *7.
224. Id.
225. Id. at *9.
226. Id.
227. 126 S.W.3d 668 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.).
228. Id. at 669-70.
229. Id. at 670.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 671.
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with the Property Code.2 32
The court noted that the Texas Property Code does not require perfect
compliance, but attempted compliance or evidence of intent to comply is
sufficient. 233 The court noted that, "in civil cases, an 'attempt' ordinarily
means 'an intent combined with an act falling short of the thing in-
tended."' 234 The court analyzed the bond and determined that it was not
conditioned on prompt payment for labor and materials, did not recite or
refer to the Property Code or its requirements, did not contain the proper
penal sum for the bond, and had other shortcomings. 235 The court con-
cluded that the bond did not satisfy the Texas Property Code require-
ments, and the subcontractor's assertion of a lien was not barred by the
bond's existence. 236
E. RETAINAGE IS PROPERTY OF SURETY, NOT BANKRUPTCY ESTATE
In American States Insurance Co. v. United States,237 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas concluded that retainage
withheld from a subcontractor that defaulted on its performance be-
longed to the completing surety, not the subcontractor's bankruptcy es-
tate.238 In that case, SSEM subcontracted with Manhattan Construction,
which was the general contractor on a construction project for the City of
Dallas Convention Center Expansion and Renovation Project. ASIC, as
surety, issued both payment and performance bonds on behalf of SSEM.
SSEM performed some work on the project, then defaulted, and later
declared bankruptcy. 23 9
Manhattan withheld over $88,000 of contract monies from SSEM dur-
ing its work, under the terms of the parties's agreement. When Manhat-
tan made demand upon ASIC to complete work for SSEM, ASIC
expended more than $430,000 to complete the contract. 240
The IRS, as one of the primary creditors of SSEM, filed a motion for
relief from the automatic stay, seeking to recover the retainage from
Manhattan. It argued that the funds were property of the SSEM estate
and that the IRS had a priority claim on them. 241 ASIC filed a competing
motion, arguing that it was entitled to the retainage under its equitable
subrogation rights and that SSEM had not earned the retainage and had
therefore never become part of the estate. 242
After analyzing case law, the subcontract, and the Bankruptcy Code,
the court concluded that the surety's interest prevented the retainage
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 672 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 116 (5th ed. 1979)).
235. Id. at 673-75.
236. Id. at 675-76.
237. 324 B.R. 600 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (mem. op.).
238. Id. at 607.
239. Id. at 601-02.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 602.
242. Id.
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from becoming the bankruptcy estate's property. 243 The court also con-
cluded that the nature of the surety's right was not a claim but an owner-
ship interest.2 44 The court noted that Texas law regarding the nature of a
surety's equitable subrogation interest indicates that it is not simply a
claim or a lien.2 45
F. RECOVERY ON INDEMNITY AGREEMENT
In United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Rey-Bach, Inc.,246 the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas granted summary
judgment in favor of a surety on claims against indemnitors on two bonds
issued in connection with school construction. 247 The court ruled that, as
a matter of law, the indemnitors had breached the duty to indemnify the
surety and had committed conversion with regard to contract funds that
the contractor received but failed to pay to subcontractors. 248 The court
said that the indemnitors had a heavy burden to avoid summary judgment
in a claim for indemnification; they had to defeat the contract's provision
that an itemized statement of payments, losses, and attorneys' fees sworn
to by surety officer would constitute prima facie evidence of the indemni-
tors's liability.249
V. ARBITRATION CLAUSES AND RIGHTS
During 2004 and 2005, the Texas courts continued to issue decisions
concerning arbitration provisions, by interpreting and applying 2003
Texas Supreme Court decisions. In 2003, the supreme court handed
down three decisions upholding arbitration limits. In Callahan & Associ-
ates v. Orangefield Independent School District,250 the supreme court out-
lined the extremely limited authority that a trial or appeals court has in
reviewing an arbitration award.251 In CVN Group, Inc. v. Delgado,252 the
court emphasized the binding nature of arbitration and refused to reverse
an arbitrator's award, even though a court of appeals found the award
erroneous under Texas law.253 In In re First Texas Homes, Inc.,254 the
supreme court strictly enforced an arbitration agreement's scope in a con-
struction contract.2 55
243. Id. at 605.
244. Id. at 607.
245. Id. at 606-07.
246. No. 3:02-CV-2133-K, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16237 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2004).
247. Id. at *10-11.
248. Id. at *7, *10-11.
249. Id. at *6.
250. 92 S.W.3d 841 (Tex. 2002).
251. Id. at 844.
252. 95 S.W.3d 234 (Tex. 2002).
253. Id. at 243.
254. 120 S.W.3d 868 (Tex. 2003).
255. Id. at 870.
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During the last two years, the courts of appeal have decided when non-
signatories are required to arbitrate, as well as other limits on the power
to review arbitration decisions.
A. NONSIGNATORIES CAN BE BOUND BY ARBITRATION PROVISIONS
In Associated Glass, Ltd. v. Eye Ten Oaks Investments, Ltd.,256 the San
Antonio Court of Appeals conditionally granted mandamus relief com-
pelling arbitration to two subcontractors being sued by developer Eye
Ten Oaks in a construction- and design-defects dispute. 257 The subcon-
tractors did not have contracts directly with the developer, but their con-
tracts with the general contractor contained identical arbitration
provisions. The court sought to determine whether Eye Ten Oaks was
attempting to assert claims that relied on the contracts between the sub-
contractors and the general contractor.258 If the developer was relying on
the underlying contracts, it could be bound by the arbitration
provision.259
To determine whether the developer was relying on the underlying
contracts, the court had to determine if the claims were "so interwoven
with the contract that [they] cannot stand alone. '2 60 If so, then the claim
would require arbitration.261 If the claims were "completely indepen-
dent" of the contracts between the subcontractors and the general con-
tractor and "could be maintained without reference to the contract," then
the arbitration agreements between the subcontractors and the general
contractor would not bind the non-signatory. 262
The court found that each of the allegations arose out of or related to
the duties and obligations created by the subcontracts. 263 And because
"a party may not avoid broad language in an arbitration clause by at-
tempting to cast complaints in tort rather than contract," the court held
that Eye Ten was bound by the arbitration provisions of the subcontracts
and that all of Eye Ten's factual allegations fell within the scope of the
arbitration provision. 264
Similarly, in Cappadonna Electrical Management v. Cameron
County,2 6 5 the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals granted mandamus relief
to compel Cameron County to arbitrate a dispute with two subcontrac-
tors that arose out of new prison facility construction.266 Claiming negli-
gence, negligence per se, breach of express warranty, and breach of
fiduciary duty, the county sued both the general contractor and the sub-
256. 147 S.W.3d 507 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet.).
257. Id. at 514.
258. Id. at 512-13.
259. Id. at 512.





265. 180 S.W.3d 364 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2005, no pet. h.).
266. Id. at 369-70.
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contractor.267 The trial court denied the subcontractor's motion to com-
pel arbitration, granted the contractor's motion to compel arbitration,
and severed the claims against the subcontractors from those against the
contractor.26
8
The subcontractors filed both a request for mandamus and an interloc-
utory appeal.269 They offered two theories-incorporation by reference
and equitable estoppel-for why the county should be bound to the sub-
contracts' arbitration provisions. 270 Ultimately, the court denied the sub-
contractors relief under incorporation by reference, but granted
mandamus under equitable estoppel.271
Incorporation by reference occurs when two or more contracts become
part of a single contract because one contract refers to another. 272 The
trial court found that the subcontract was not part of the prime contract
between the county and the general contractor. 273 The court of appeals
agreed, finding that the intent of the parties to the general contract was to
specifically disclaim any contractual relationship between the county and
the subcontractors. 274 Thus, the court of appeals found that a non-signa-
tory third party cannot be compelled to arbitrate through incorporation
by reference if the party neither signed the agreement nor incorporated it
into a contract that it did sign.275 That is, a party cannot unilaterally bind
a third party to an agreement through the doctrine of incorporation by
reference.
The subcontractors fared better under the theory of equitable estoppel.
The court recognized two circumstances under which a non-signatory can
compel a signatory to arbitrate claims between them: "(1) when the signa-
tory has raised allegations of substantially interdependent and concerted
misconduct by both the non-signatory and one or more of the signatories
to the contract; or (2) when the nature of the signatory's claims against
the non-signatory requires reliance on the agreement containing an arbi-
tration provision. ' 276 That is, if the non-signatory attempts to directly
benefit from the contract by enforcing the terms of the contract against
one of the signatories, then the non-signatory is bound to arbitrate if the
267. Id. at 373-75.
268. Id. at 368-69.
269. Mandamus is the proper remedy for a denial of a motion to compel arbitration
arising out of the Federal Arbitration Act, whereas an interlocutory appeal is the proper
course for a denial under the Texas Arbitration Act. The Texas Supreme Court has in-
structed courts of appeal to consolidate such proceedings and render a decision that dis-
poses of both simultaneously. Id. at 369; see In re Valero Energy Corp., 968 S.W.2d 916,
917 (Tex. 1998).
270. The Texas Supreme Court recognizes six theories for binding a non-signatory to an
arbitration provision: (1) incorporation by reference; (2) assumption; (3) agency; (4) alter
ego; (5) equitable estoppel; and (6) third-party beneficiary. Cappadonna, 180 S.W.3d at
370-71; see In re Kellogg, Brown & Root, 166 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. 2005).
271. Cappadonna, 180 S.W.3d at 373-75.
272. Id. at 370-71.
273. Id. at 371.
274. Id. at 372.
275. Id. at 372-73.
276. Id. at 373.
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contract contains an arbitration provision. 277
The question of whether a non-signatory attempted to derive a direct
benefit from the contract's enforcement is a highly fact-specific in-
quiry.278 A party attempts to derive a direct benefit when it seeks to
exploit not just the relationship between the signatories, but also the
rights and duties of the contract itself.279 Or, as the Texas Supreme Court
said, "when a nonparty consistently and knowingly insists that others
treat it as a party, it cannot later turn its back on the portions of the
contract, such as an arbitration clause, that it finds distasteful. A non-
party cannot both have its contract and defeat it too. '2 80
In this case, the county sought damages for breach of fiduciary duty
arising out of the subcontracts, and it implied that the subcontractors and
the county were in a contractual relationship through the contract be-
tween the county and the general contractor.28 1 By framing its petition
so as to imply that the subcontractors had a contractual relationship with
the county, the county was exploiting not just the contractual relationship
between the subcontractors and the general contractor, but the subcon-
tracts themselves. 282 Such exploitation of the subcontract's obligations
gives rise to the so-called direct-benefits equitable estoppel. 283
B. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT MUST BE SATISFIED
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals heard another mandamus pro-
ceeding, this one requesting that a subcontract's contingent arbitration
provision be given effect against the general contractor. In Alpha Ma-
sonry, Inc. v. Peterson Construction, Inc.,284 the appellant-subcontractors
appealed a denial of their motions to compel arbitration in separate suits
between them and Peterson, the general contractor.285 The subcontracts
contained an arbitration provision that was contingent on the general
contract between the contractor and developer having an enforceable ar-
bitration provision between the contractor and the developer. Because
the trial court previously denied Peterson's motion to compel arbitration
against the developer and because the court of appeals denied Peterson's
petition for writ of mandamus, the court of appeals in the suit between
Peterson and the developer tacitly decided that the general contract did
277. Id.
278. See id. at 373-74.
279. Id.
280. Id. (citing In re Weekley Homes, No. 04-0119, 2005 Tex. LEXIS 989, at *23 (Tex.
Oct. 28, 2005)).
281. The county's claim contained the following language (Landmark was the general
contractor): "Landmark and the [Subcontractors] are subsequently liable under their
agreement with the County. Landmark and the [Subcontractors] failed to strictly comply
with the agreement and are liable for damages proximately caused by such breach." Id. at
374.
282. Id. at 374-75.
283. Id.
284. No. 13-04-641-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 352 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Jan. 18,
2005, pet. denied).
285. Id. at *1-3.
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not contain an enforceable arbitration provision.286 Thus, the subcon-
tract's arbitration-provision condition precedent was not met, and the
subcontractors' petitions for writ of mandamus were denied. 287
C. UNCONSCIONABILITY
In Pine Ridge Homes, Inc. v. Stone,288 the Dallas Court of Appeals
determined that an arbitration provision in a residential-home contract is
unconscionable when, in light of the parties' available remedies and the
general commercial background and needs of the parties, it "grossly fa-
vors" one party over the other.2 89 The Stones entered into a new-home
contract with Pine Ridge that contained several provisions favoring Pine
Ridge. The contract provided that it was contingent on the Stones ob-
taining construction financing. The lender was willing to make the loan if
Pine Ridge would agree to a ten-percent retainage pending final inspec-
tion. Pine Ridge refused to alter its draw schedule, and the lender denied
the Stones' loan application. The Stones cancelled the contract and de-
manded the return of their earnest money, which Pine Ridge also
refused. 290
The contract's arbitration provision required that the party submitting
the arbitration demand pay the other party's arbitration costs. 291 The
American Arbitration Association ("AAA") deemed this provision to be
a "material or substantial deviation" from its Consumer Rules and Proto-
col.292 The AAA would only administer the dispute if Pine Ridge agreed
to waive that provision and pay its own fee, but Pine Ridge refused.2 93
The Stones then filed suit in district court, and Pine Ridge motioned the
court to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion, holding
inter alia that the arbitration provision was unconscionable because it re-
quired the Stones to pay all arbitration fees.2 94
The court of appeals agreed.295 The Stones' only remedy under the
contract was return of their earnest money, and the only way they could
obtain it was to demand arbitration.2 96 Pine Ridge, on the other hand,
retained its right to seek any remedies allowed by law.297 In addition, the
court found that the contract was on a pre-printed form and that the arbi-
tration provision was contrary to the AAA's due-process protocol.2 98 Fi-
286. Id. at *10.
287. Id. at *10-11.
288. No. 05-04-00002-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 6979 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 3,
2004, no pet. h.).
289. Id. at *7-8.
290. Id. at *2-3.
291. Id. at *2.
292. Id. at *4.
293. Id.
294. Id. at *4-5.
295. Id. at *7.
296. Id. at *8.
297. Id.
298. Id. at *7.
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nally, and most importantly, Pine Ridge could keep the Stones' earnest
money.29 9 "It thus had a remedy without resort to arbitration or being
required to pay any fees."'300 Therefore, the court found that, although
the arbitration clause appeared to apply equally to both parties, "a review
of the agreement in the light of the remedies available shows it grossly
favored Pine Ridge. '30 1
D. NOTICE PROVISIONS Do NOT CREATE BINDING AGREEMENT
A construction defect notice provision similar to that required in sec-
tion 27.007 of the Texas Property Code did not bind the parties to arbi-
trate construction-defect claims in Bates v. MTH Homes-Texas, L.P.
30 2
Bates sued MTH Homes for construction defects that occurred during
the construction of the Bates' new home. When MTH's motion to com-
pel arbitration was granted, the Bates' appealed and filed a petition for
writ of mandamus.30 3
The clause at issue was contained in the earnest-money-contract adden-
dum to the general contract and stated: "[T]he purchaser must provide
notice regarding the defect to the builder by certified mail, return receipt
requested, not later than the 60th day before the date the purchaser initi-
ates a claim to recover damages in an arbitration proceeding. '30 4 The
court found that this provision was substantially similar to Texas Property
Code section 27.007, except that the Code's provision stated that notice
had to be given "before the date you file suit to recover damages in a
court of law or initiate arbitration. '30 5 MTH argued that this clause
showed the Bates' intent to arbitrate their construction defect claims.
30 6
The court of appeals disagreed, finding that the language was not suffi-
ciently express, plain, clear, and certain of the party's intent.30 7 The bet-
ter interpretation, according to the court, was that if the Bates decided to
seek damages in an arbitration proceeding, then they had to give the
builder sixty-days' notice. 30 8 And because a party cannot be bound to
arbitrate unless it expressly agrees to do so, the Bates' petition was condi-
tionally granted, and the trial court was ordered to vacate its order com-
pelling arbitration. 30 9
E. GOVERNMENT ENTITIES AND ARBITRATION
In Gene Duke Builders, Inc. v. Abilene Housing Authority,310 the East-
299. Id. at *8.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. 177 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet. h.).
303. Id. at 421.
304. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 27.007 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
305. Bates, 177 S.W.3d at 423.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 424.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 424-25.
310. 168 S.W.3d 215 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2005, pet. filed).
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land Court of Appeals held that Texas Government Code Chapter 2260,
which establishes administrative procedures for disputes between individ-
uals and governmental units, does not apply to municipal housing author-
ities, which are amenable to suit or arbitration if provided for by
contract. 311 Gene Duke Builders, Inc. ("Duke") contracted with the Abi-
lene Housing Authority ("AHA") to repair housing units in Abilene.
Duke filed a claim with the construction administrator after a dispute
arose concerning payment and completion of the project. AHA denied
Duke's claim, and Duke demanded arbitration pursuant to its contract
with AHA. When AHA refused, Duke sued to enforce the arbitration
clause. The trial court originally ordered the parties to arbitration, but
when the AHA filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting that it was a state-
government unit under Texas Government Code Chapter 2260, the trial
court vacated its arbitration order and dismissed the case for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. 312 Thus, the court of appeals sought to determine
whether a housing authority is a unit of state government under the Texas
Government Code. 313 If a housing authority is a unit of state, as opposed
to local government, then the trial court would indeed lack subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to Texas Government Code Chapter 2600.314 Find-
ing no authority that it was a unit of state government rather than local
government, the court held that Chapter 2600 did not apply and that the
trial court had jurisdiction to order arbitration. 315 The court reinstated
the order to arbitrate. 316
F. CHALLENGES TO ARBITRATION AWARDS
The case of Anchor Paving Co., Inc. v. Wood Electrical Services, Inc. 317
raised the issue of whether, upon receiving an arbitration award, a party
should file a summary-judgment motion or a motion to confirm the
award. 318 Wood filed suit to confirm an arbitration award against
Anchor. Anchor filed counterclaims seeking to have the award vacated,
corrected, or modified on the ground that the arbitrator committed will-
ful misconduct in refusing to grant Anchor additional time to subpoena
311. Id. at 219. Chapter 2260 of the Texas Government Code established administra-
tive procedures controlling disputes between individuals and units of state government.
312. Id. at 217.
313. Id. at 218.
314. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. ch. 2260 (Vernon 2001).
315. Gene Duke Builders, 168 S.W.3d at 220. The court surveyed the Texas Local Gov-
ernment Code and found that a housing authority (a) cannot operate until a municipality
governing body declares it necessary by a resolution (TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN.
§ 392.011(c)); (b) is geographically limited to the municipality that created it (TEX. Loc.
GOV'T CODE ANN. § 392.014); and (c) is not governed by the state, but rather by the pre-
siding officer of the municipality's governing body (TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN.
§ 392.031(a)). The court also found that according to the Dallas Court of Appeals, a mu-
nicipal housing authority is a unit of city government, created by and existing only with the
consent of the city.
316. Gene Duke Builders, 168 S.W.3d at 222.
317. No. 14-03-00224-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 8748 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] Sept. 30, 2004, no pet.).
318. Id. at *1.
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three witnesses during the arbitration.319 Wood then filed a no-evidence
motion for summary judgment that the trial court granted, entering judg-
ment for Wood in the amount of damages the arbitrator determined and
denying Anchor's counterclaims.320
On appeal, Anchor argued that, because Wood filed a no-evidence
summary-judgment motion, the court was precluded from examining evi-
dence that the arbitrator granted Anchor three rescheduling requests
before arbitration began.321 The court agreed, holding that a no-evidence
summary judgment can only be sustained if the nonmovant cannot come
forward with more than a scintilla of evidence.322 The court found that it
could only examine Anchor's evidence that Wood did not allow it to sub-
poena three additional witnesses, and it found sufficient evidence to re-
verse the trial court; "An arbitrator can commit misconduct by
preventing a party from presenting evidence. ' 323 In dicta, the court
noted that had Wood filed a motion to confirm the arbitration award, the
court could have examined and considered "all the evidence and could
have indulged all reasonable presumptions in favor of the award, just as
the trial court would have. '324
VI. MECHANIC'S & MATERIALMAN'S LIENS
During 2004 and 2005, the Texas courts issued several opinions regard-
ing mechanic's lien rights under the Texas Constitution and the Texas
Property Code. The decisions focused on issues such as the owners' role
in creating liens, notice requirements under the Property Code, protec-
tion of homestead property, services that qualify for liens, fraudulent
liens, and limitations on liens.
A. CONTRACT WITH ACTUAL OWNER REQUIRED
Absent an agency relationship or equitable considerations, the legal
owners of real property cannot be bound to a contract that an equitable
owner makes that fixes a lien on his or her interest in the property.325
This was the holding of Gibson v. Bostick Roofing & Sheet Metal, in
which the El Paso Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of
Bostick's request to foreclose on a mechanic's and materialman's lien
against Gibson. The lien was allegedly created by a contract to repair the
roof between Bostick and Brown, who was an equitable owner of an
apartment complex legally owned by Gibson.326 Brown had represented
to Bostick that he owned the complex and that insurance would cover the
319. Id. at *3.
320. Id.
321. See id. at *4.
322. Id. at *4-5.
323. Id. at *9.
324. Id. at *11 n.5.
325. See Gibson v. Bostick Roofing & Sheet Metal, 148 S.W.3d 482 (Tex. App.-E1
Paso 2004, no pet.).
326. Id. at 495.
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repair costs. Although insurance covered the repair costs, Brown had
forged Gibson's signature and cashed the checks.327 When Bostick
learned that Gibson was the complex's legal owner, he notified Gibson of
the lien and filed suit against him and Brown.328 The trial court found
that Gibson admitted that Brown was an owner who had the authority to
contract with Bostick and that Gibson was unjustly enriched and in-
debted to Bostick in the amount of the repair costs plus attorney's fees,
and it allowed foreclosure on Bostick's mechanic's and materialman's
lien.329
The court of appeals reversed, finding that Bostick could not recover
from Gibson and could not foreclose against Gibson's property based on
either quantum meruit or sworn account theories.330 The court found that
Bostick's quantum meruit claim failed because Bostick testified that he
undertook the work for Brown's benefit rather than Gibson's. 331 In addi-
tion, the court held that a third party or stranger to an agreement cannot
be held liable under a sworn account, even in the absence of a written
denial under oath.332
Finally, the court of appeals considered whether Gibson was bound to
the contract for services under Bostick's agency theory.333 A finding of
either actual or apparent authority would bind Gibson to the repair con-
tract between Brown and Bostick and would subject the property to ei-
ther a constitutional or statutory lien.334
The court reviewed case law interpreting Article 16, section 37 of the
Texas Constitution, which states: "Mechanics, artisans and material men,
of every class, shall have a lien upon the buildings and articles made or
repaired by them for the value of their labor done thereon, or material
furnished therefore. '335 The court found that Texas courts have consist-
ently held that a lien is created only when the property owner contracts
for repairs and the original contractor files suit.336 The court found fur-
ther that no privity of contract existed between Bostick and Gibson and
that Brown had neither actual nor apparent authority to obligate Gib-
son.337 Therefore, the court concluded that Brown could not fix a consti-
327. Id. at 488.
328. Id. at 487.
329. Id. at 487.
330. Id. at 496.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 491-92.
334. Id. at 491.
335. Id. at 493 (citing TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 37).
336. Id. at 493 (citing Rhoades v. Miller, 414 S.W.2d 942, 944 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1967, no writ), Berger Eng'g Co. v. Village Casuals, Inc., 576 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1978, no writ), and Wiseman Hardware Co. v. R. L. King Const. Co., 387
S.W.2d 79, 81 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965, no writ)). The court also looked at whether
Bostick was an original contractor or a subcontractor, but the court did not decide the
issue. Id. at 494.
337. Id. at 492-94.
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tutional lien on the property.338
A statutory lien is created under Texas Property Code section 53.001, if
"(2) the person labors, specially fabricates the material, or furnishes the
labor or materials under or by virtue of a contract with the owner or the
owner's agent, trustee, receiver, contractor, or subcontractor. '339 Unlike
the constitutional lien, the statutory mechanic's lien can attach "to the
interest of the person contracting for construction. '340 That is, a
mechanic's lien can be fixed to an equitable interest in the property if the
equitable owner makes the contract. 341 However, the lien expires once
the equitable interest expires. 342 Such was the case here. In December
1995, Brown quitclaim deeded his interest in the property back to Gib-
son, thereby extinguishing the equitable interest.343 Thus, the court con-
cluded that there was no legal basis to find that Bostick could, either
constitutionally or via statute, affix a lien on Gibson's interest in the
apartment complex, and it reversed and rendered judgment that Bostick
take nothing against Gibson. 344
B. NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
In The New AAA Apartment Plumbers, Inc. v. DPMC-Briarcliff
L.P.,345 the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that the notice require-
ment of Texas Property Code section 53.055(a) was satisfied, even though
the lien affidavit's filing notice was sent before the affidavit was filed.346
This reversed the trial court's determination that, as a matter of law,
AAA had failed to perfect its lien because it sent notice before filing the
lien affidavit.347 Called upon to interpret the language of section
53.055(a), the court found that "mechanic's and materialman's statutes
are to be liberally construed for the purpose of protecting laborers and
materialmen. ' '348 The court further found that "substantial compliance
with the relevant sections of the property code is sufficient to perfect a
mechanic's and materialman's lien. ' 349 Thus, AAA's system of lien noti-
fication, which resulted in notice being sent days before the affidavit was
filed, did not preclude it from meeting the section 53.055(a) require-
ments, which states: "[a] person who files an affidavit must send a copy of
the affidavit by registered or certified mail to the owner not later than the
fifth day after the date the affidavit is filed with the county clerk. '350
338. Id. at 494.
339. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.021(a)(2) (Vernon 2005).
340. Gibson, 148 S.W.3d at 495.




344. Id. at 495-96.
345. 145 S.W.3d 728 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.).
346. Id. at 731.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 730.
349. Id.
350. Id. (emphasis in original).
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AAA's notice was not otherwise deficient and met the requiring notice's
purpose, which is "to ensure that a property owner will not be ambushed
by recorded liens. ' 351 The dissent said that it would not have read the
statute so expansively. 352
The perfection and notice requirements of the Texas Government
Code Chapter 2253.041, section 253.073 were at issue in Capitol Indem-
nity Corp. v. Kirby Restaurant Equipment & Chemical Supply Co.353
Kirby provided labor and materials for a public-works project for which
Capitol had issued a payment bond under Texas Government Code sec-
tion 2253.001(a), and, when it had not been paid, it sought payment under
the bond.354 Under cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court
ruled in favor of Kirby.355 On appeal, Capitol challenged only the court's
finding that Kirby had perfected its claim and provided sufficient notice
under sections 2253.041 and 2253.073.356
Section 2253.073 requires that a beneficiary under a payment bond
properly perfect its claim before bringing suit.357 Perfection requires no-
tice, which, under section 2253.041(a), requires that the beneficiary mail a
written notice to the primary contractor and to the surety.358 Notice must
be "accompanied by a sworn statement of account that states in sub-
stance: (1) the amount claimed is just and correct; and (2) all just and
lawful offsets, payments, and credits known to the affiant have been al-
lowed. ' 359 Kirby mailed a letter to Capitol that contained a sworn docu-
ment entitled "Application and Certificate for Payment." The letter
stated that it was intended to provide notice of non-payment, and the
sworn Application and Certificate for Payment indicated the amount due,
that the work had been "completed in accordance with the Contract Doc-
ument," and that the Contractor paid all amounts due for work for which
previous Certifications for Payment were issued and payments received
from the Owner .... ,,360 The court held that the sworn document need
not strictly conform to the specific language of section 2253.041(c). 3 61
The court found that language indicating that the work was completed
according to the contract was sufficient to show that the charges were
"just and correct. ' 362 In addition, the statement in Kirby's sworn docu-
ment that the contractor paid for all other work and needed only to pay
the present amount suggested that "all just and lawful offsets, payments,
and credits known to the affiant have been allowed." 363 Therefore, the
351. Id.
352. Id. at 731.
353. 170 S.W.3d 144 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2005, pet. denied).
354. Id. at 146-47.
355. Id. at 146.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 147.
358. Id.
359. Id. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2253.041(c) (Vernon 2005).
360. Capitol, 170 S.W.3d at 147.
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court held that the purposes of the statute-to provide the surety with
"knowledge of the substance of the claim" and to give those who furnish
labor and materials "a simple and direct method of providing notice of
their claim"- were met with Kirby's letter.364 The court affirmed the
trial court's judgment for Kirby and dismissed Capitol's points of error.365
In Wesco Distribution, Inc. v. Westport Group, Inc., the Austin Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling that Wesco's lien was invalid due
to improper notice. 366 Wesco provided materials for a dental-office pro-
ject on which Westport was the general contractor. Westport's subcon-
tractor, J&D Electric, failed to pay Wesco for the materials, and "Wesco
attempted to send notice by mail to Westport" of the outstanding bill.
The notice was returned for inadequate postage. Wesco had until July 15,
2001 to notify Westport, but because its notice was returned, Westport
did not receive notice until after July 25, 2001. In the period between
Wesco sending the first and second notice, Westport, having no notice of
Wesco's lien, paid J&D Electric. Thus, the question before the court was
whether Wesco's original notice met the statutory requirements of Texas
Property Code section 53.056(b), regardless of whether Westport re-
ceived it on time. 367 The court agreed with Westport's argument that
"sending" notice by mail "necessarily includes attaching sufficient post-
age."'368 Although the court acknowledged that it had to liberally con-
strue the Property Code's mechanic's and materialman's liens provisions,
it found that if the legislature intended sufficient postage to not be re-
quired, Wesco's lien would be enforceable without resending notice and
without Westport ever actually receiving notice. 369 The court said that
this would be an absurd result.370 Additionally, because the notice re-
quirement "plays a critical role" in the mechanic's- and materialman's-
lien statutes, "substantial compliance" that did not result in timely written
notice would do violence to the statute. 37' Thus, the court affirmed trial
court's judgment that the lien was invalid due to untimely notice.372
C. HOMESTEAD EXEMPTON
In Kendall Builders, Inc. v. Chesson, the Austin Court of Appeals af-
firmed the trial court's ruling that the contractor's liens were invalid be-
cause the property on which the contractor claimed the liens was the
appellee's homestead under the Texas Constitution. 373 In particular, the
court held that a family need not occupy the property claimed as its
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. 150 S.W.3d 553, 562 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no pet.).
367. Id. at 556.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 558.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 558-60.
372. Id. at 561.




homestead, so long as there is sufficient evidence of "a total abandon-
ment of a [prior] homestead with an intention not to return and claim the
exemption. '374 Jane Chesson and her husband, Phillip Cullen, were relo-
cating to Austin from California and had purchased a home in Austin that
required extensive remodeling and refurbishing before it could be occu-
pied. They contracted with Kendall to provide remodeling services and
materials. Cullen, who had been transferred to Austin by his employer,
moved to Austin, and Chesson stayed in California with the family's chil-
dren awaiting completion of the remodeling. The family became dissatis-
fied with Kendall's performance and terminated the contract, whereupon
Kendall placed a lien on the property pursuant to Texas Property Code
section 53.254. 375
If the property was the family's homestead, then Kendall's perfection
procedures were inadequate to attach its lien on the property.376 Aban-
donment is a question of fact, which the trial court answered by finding
that the family had abandoned its California home for the Austin prop-
erty.377 The court of appeals noted that moving from one state to another
constitutes evidence of abandonment, especially when a new home is "ac-
quired or used with the intention of making it a homestead. ' 378 The
court further noted that in the present case, Cullen had moved out of the
California home, and the adult family members had registered to vote
(and did in fact vote) in Texas, transferred their driver's licenses to Texas,
relocated and registered their car in Texas, and opened a joint-checking
account in Austin.379 This evidence, said the court, was legally and factu-
ally sufficient to support the trial court's finding that the family had aban-
doned their California home. 380
The court then went on to determine if there was sufficient evidence to
support the trial court's finding that the Austin home was the family's
homestead at the time it contracted with Kendall.381 The family was not
occupying the house at the time, so in order to establish the house as the
family's homestead, it was necessary to provide evidence showing "an ex-
isting bona fide intention to dedicate the property as a homestead" and
"acts of preparation and such prompt subsequent occupation as will
amount to notice of the dedication. '38 2 The court recounted the evidence
of the family's intention to live in Austin and noted that, before engaging
Kendall, the family hired an interior decorator. 38 3 Moreover, the court
found that Kendall had actual notice that the family intended to make the
374. Kendall, 149 S.W.3d at 808.
375. Id. at 800-01.
376. Id. at 807. In particular, only one of the spouses signed the contract that was the
basis for the lien rather than both, as required by TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.154. Id.
377. Id. at 808.
378. Id. at 808-09.
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Austin property its homestead. 384 Under these facts, the court had no
trouble affirming the trial court's factual findings and judgment invalidat-
ing Kendall's liens. 385
D. PLACEMENT AGENCY ENTITLED TO LIEN
In Advance'd Temporaries, Inc. v. Reliance Surety Co., the Corpus
Christi Court of Appeals found that, under certain circumstances, a la-
bor-placement agency is a "person" entitled to a mechanic's lien under
Texas Property Code Chapter 53.386 The trial court found against Ad-
vance'd, the temporary agency, but the court of appeals reversed and
found that, under the particular facts of the case, Advance'd had "fur-
nished" labor and therefore was entitled to a lien under Texas Property
Code section 53.021.387
The court was careful to note that not all temporary employment ar-
rangements will establish that the firm "furnished" labor; it is a question
of fact based on "the nature of the arrangement among Advance'd, the
temporary workers it supplied, and Gonzalez (the general contrac-
tor).'"388 There are seven factors that the court identified when consider-
ing whether labor has been furnished:
(1) the temporary employment agency's involvement in selecting and
screening the workers for hire; (2) the use by the agency of its own
criteria for hiring the workers; (3) affirmative representations by the
agency to the workers that it is their employer; (4) the nature of doc-
umentation exchanged between the workers and the agency at the
start of the working relationship; (5) the agency's involvement in
training, supervising, and disciplining the workers and otherwise re-
taining control over the workers or directing their behavior; (6)
whether the agency rather than the contractor determined which
workers could be terminated; and (7) whether the agency withheld
workers rather than services on nonpayment by the contractor.389
Reliance argued that Advance'd had only provided administrative ser-
vices, and the trial court agreed, finding that Advance'd merely provided
the contractor with recruiting, payroll, and worker's-compensation-insur-
ance services. 390 The court of appeals disagreed, noting that the record
indicated that Advance'd recruited and hired all workers as its own em-
ployees, qualified the workers by verifying legal documentation, issued
paychecks to the workers, and made all applicable payroll deductions. 391
The court also noted that the record showed that the contractor never
384. Id. at 810.
385. Id. at 811.
386. 165 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, pet. granted).
387. Id. at 6. "A person has a lien if the person ... furnishes the labor or materials
under or by virtue of a contract with the owner or the owner's agent, trustee, receiver,
contractor, or subcontractor." TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.021(a)(2) (Vernon 2005).
388. Advance'd, 165 S.W.3d at 5.
389. Id. at 5-6.




undertook any screening or hiring qualification decisions.392 Based on




In Centurion Planning Corp., Inc. v. Seabrook Venture II, the Houston
Court of Appeals found that the trial court did not err in submitting to
the jury Seabrook's claim for violation of the fraudulent lien statute,
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 12.001. 394 Seabrook
contracted with Centurion to provide engineering services to develop a
residential plat in Seabrook, Texas. There was no written agreement, but
the oral agreement specified that the plat had to meet all of the city's
conditions and ordinances. When Centurion presented the plat to the
city, several problems were discovered. Seabrook requested that Centu-
rion make the necessary changes, but Centurion refused. Subsequently,
Seabrook cancelled the contract and refused to pay. Centurion filed a
lien notice for $39,416.30. 395 Seabrook then filed a declaratory-judgment
action, arguing that the lien was null and void under Texas Property Code
section 53.021(c) and that Centurion, therefore, presented a fraudulent
lien in violation of Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code section
12.002.396 The jury found that Centurion had no valid lien rights and had
presented a fraudulent lien.397
Texas Property Code section 53.021(c) gives an engineer with a written
contract a lien on the subject property.3 98 In this case, it was uncontested
that the parties had no written contract. Because there was no written
contract, Centurion could not have had a valid lien on the property.
399
An engineer who attempts to fix a lien on property that is not the subject
of a valid contract for engineering services and an engineer who attempts
to fix a lien on property in the absence of a valid written contract for
engineering services violates Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code sec-
tion 53.021(c). 400
Section 12.002(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
makes it a violation for anyone to make, present, or use a document that
the person knows is a fraudulent lien or claim against real property.
40 1
Centurion argued that this provision did not apply because it was enacted
in response to an anti-government group called the Republic of Texas
who filed fraudulent court documents. 40 2 But the court of appeals dis-
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. 176 S.W.3d 498 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.).
395. Id. at 502-03.
396. Id. at 503.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 504.
399. Id.
400. See id.
401. Id. at 504-05.
402. Id. at 504.
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agreed, finding that rules of statutory construction instructed that the
statute's plain and common meaning controlled. 40 3 Therefore, it was not
error for the trial court to allow the question of whether the engineer had
violated section 12.002 to go to the jury.404 The fact that section 12.002
was enacted in response to an anti-government group that had made
fraudulent court filings and fake documents did not change the plain lan-
guage of the statute. The legislature could have chosen to limit the stat-
ute's application but did not.40 5
F. ASSIGNMENT OF LIEN
A general contractor assigned a lender both a lien created by contract
and a Texas Property Code lien in MG Building Materials, Ltd. v. Moses
Lopez Custom Homes, Inc. 40 6 In this case, the Gonzales family con-
tracted with Lopez Custom Homes for construction of their new home
and gave it a mechanic's-lien contract to secure payment on a note. Lo-
pez, in turn, assigned to MG "all of Contractor's rights, privileges and
equities under any by virtue of the indebtedness, lien and Mechanic's
Lien Contract. '40 7 Lopez began construction in December 2001 and
made six draw requests through February 2003. Lopez made its seventh
and final draw request in March 2003 for $17,044.51, which was approxi-
mately $12,000 more than remained on the Gonzales note. MG, the note
holder, issued a check for $4,683.87 to Lopez, but held the amount in
escrow pending the Gonzales's obtaining permanent financing to close on
the home. Due to a pending divorce, the Gonzales's never obtained that
financing, resulting in MG foreclosing on the note.40 8
Before foreclosure, Lopez filed a claim for a mechanic's lien on the
$17,044.51 and filed suit to foreclose on the lien. The trial court entered a
partial summary judgment in favor of Lopez on the foreclosure. 40 9 MG
challenged the judgment, claiming that the trial court erred in interpret-
ing the lien assignment as applying only to the mechanic's-lien contract
between Lopez and Gonzales. 410 The court of appeals agreed with MG,
finding that the proper interpretation of the lien assignment was that it
applied to both the mechanic's-lien contract and to the statutory lien
under Texas Property Code section 53.021(a)(2). 411 Specifically, the
court found that the new-home contract and mechanic's-lien contract
should be read together because they comprised a single agreement;
therefore, Lopez "intended to assign to MG whatever right it might have
to assert a future lien claim associated with the construction of the Gon-
403. Id.
404. Id. at 505-06.
405. Id. at 505.
406. 179 S.W.3d 51, 59 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2005, pet. denied).
407. Id. at 55.
408. Id. at 55-56.
409. Id. at 56.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 59.
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zales home, whether by virtue of the new home contract or the
mechanic's lien contract. '4 12 The court reversed the trial court's sum-
mary judgment that foreclosed on Lopez's $17,044.51 mechanic's and ma-
terialman's lien.413
G. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON LIEN RIGHTS
The interplay of several Texas Property Code sections was at issue in
determining whether the statute of limitations had run on a subcontrac-
tor's lien claim in San Antonio Masonry & Tool Supply, Inc. v. Epstein &
Sons International, Inc.41 4 The trial court found that Masonry's lien was
barred by limitations, but the court of appeals reversed, finding that suit
on the claim was filed within the statutory time period specified under
Texas Property Code section 53.175(a). 415 That section provides that suit
must be filed within either one year after claim notice is served or after
the date on which the underlying lien claim becomes unenforceable by
statute.4 16 Texas Property Code section 53.158 invalidates lien claims
made more than two years after the last day a claimant may file a lien
affidavit. 41 7 The parties agreed that Masonry had until April 15, 2001 to
file its lien affidavit.41 8 Therefore, by statute, Masonry had until April 15,
2003 to file suit to foreclose on the lien. 419 Because it filed suit on April
14, 2003, its claim was not barred by limitations. 4 2
0
Likewise, the general contractor filed an indemnity bond once Ma-
sonry filed its recorded mechanic's lien.421 The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the general contractor, again on limitations.4 22
Citing the same Texas Property Code provisions, the court of appeals re-
versed the trial court's judgment.423
VII. CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES
In the context of general construction disputes, the Texas courts issued
opinions concerning evidence in construction litigation, substantial per-
formance in a construction dispute, and conditional-payment clauses.
412. Id.
413. Id. at 60.
414. No. 04-04-00032-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 1089, at *1 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
Feb. 9, 2005), remanded, No. 04-04-00032-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 4757 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio June 22, 2005).
415. San Antonio Masonry, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 1089, at *6-7.
416. Id.
417. Id. at *5.
418. Id.
419. Id. at *6.
420. Id. at *5-6.
421. Id. at *6.
422. Id. at *3.
423. Id. at *9.
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A. CONTRACT AND TORT CLAIMS
In Barnett v. Coppell North Texas Court, Ltd., the Dallas Court of Ap-
peals considered several contract and tort theories on Barnett's appeal of
an adverse judgment.424 Barnett's construction company contracted with
Coppell to build a new gymnastics facility, but stopped construction
before the project was completed. The bank foreclosed on the property
and sued both Barnett and Coppell. Coppell cross-claimed against Bar-
nett for breach of contract and received a jury verdict in its favor.425 Bar-
nett appealed the judgment, arguing that his claims for unjust
enrichment, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, DTPA violations, and
breach of warranty were all established as a matter of law.426
As to the breach-of-contract claim, the jury found that both Barnett
and Coppell failed to perform under the contract, but that Barnett's fail-
ure excused Coppell's failure.427 The court found some evidence to sup-
port the jury's judgment, specifically that Barnett delayed performance,
made mistakes as to the placement of structural piers, and walked off the
job in the summer of 1999.428 Further, Barnett waived his argument that
Coppell waived Barnett's breach, because he failed to plead the defense
or to request the related jury questions.429
On his unjust enrichment claim, the court found that unjust enrichment
itself is not a claim upon which relief can be granted, but is instead a part
of a claim for restitution or quantum meruit.430 But even assuming that
Barnett had pleaded correctly, his claims failed because the only evidence
he offered to show that he provided a benefit to Coppell was draw re-
quests submitted to the bank. 431 Such requests, which did not contain
copies of invoices or bills, did not establish that any services at all were
provided.432 A draw request, by itself, is no evidence that a subcontrac-
tor furnished "valuable services and/or materials. '433
The court found that Barnett failed to establish, as a matter of law, that
Coppell negligently misrepresented the project's lending status.434 The
most that Barnett showed was that there was a possibility that the bank
made a misrepresentation, not that Coppell had. 435 Instead, the court
affirmed judgment for Coppell on its misrepresentation claim, noting that
in testimony, Barnett represented that he would finish the project on
time, had enough workers, and would do "great quality work."'436
424. 123 S.W.3d 804 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet. denied).
425. Id. at 812.
426. Id.
427. Id. at 815.
428. Id. at 815-16.
429. Id. at 816.
430. Id. at 816-17.
431. Id. at 817.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Id. at 819.
435. Id.
436. Id. at 820.
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In a hollow victory for Barnett, the court found that the trial judge's
submission of Coppell's fraud claim was erroneous.43 7 Unfortunately for
Barnett, he failed to object to the trial court's submission of a compound
question concerning damages for fraud, breach of warranty, or violations
of the DTPA.438 In addition, the court found the evidence sufficient to
support the jury's findings of breach of warranty and DTPA violations
against Barnett. Thus, any error was harmless. 439
The evidence of DTPA violations consisted of Coppell's reliance on
Barnett for project management, Coppell's relative inexperience bidding
construction projects, Barnett's guarantee that the project would be fin-
ished, and his representation that he had adequate workers and "time to
spare. '440 Coppell presented evidence that, without these representa-
tions, it would not have hired Barnett. This constituted sufficient evi-
dence that "Barnett engaged in a false, misleading, or deceptive act or
practice that appellees relied on to their detriment. '441
Finally, on Coppell's breach-of-warranty claim, Barnett argued that the
evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the jury's find-
ings. 442 However, the court found that the record showed that Barnett
failed to complete his work and that Texas courts hold that such failure is
a breach of the warranty of good and workmanlike manner.443 The sub-
sequent property owner also testified that a lot of work remained to be
done on the property and that the existing work had to be redone. Taken
together, this evidence was sufficient to uphold the jury's finding.4 44
B. SUBSTANTIAL PERFORMANCE AND GOVERNING AGREEMENT
When a subcontract provides that payment is dependent on the archi-
tect's final approval and that approval is not given, the subcontractor
does not have a right to summary judgment on its breach-of-contract
claim against the general contractor according to the Houston Court of
Appeals in Tribble & Stephens Co. v. RGM Constructors, L.P.445 After
performance problems related to the concrete resulted in the architect's
disapproval, Tribble hired a third party to fix and finish RGM's concrete
work. RGM filed suit against Tribble for the contract's unpaid balance,
arguing that its work conformed to the contract. 446 The trial court agreed
with RGM, granted summary judgment in its favor, and denied Tribble's
motion for summary judgment.4 47
437. Id.
438. Id. at 820-21.
439. Id. at 821.
440. Id. at 822.
441. Id. at 823.
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. Id. at 823-24.
445. 154 S.W.3d 639, 653 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).
446. Id. at 648.
447. Id.
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On appeal, Tribble argued that the trial court erred in granting RGM's
summary-judgment motion because there were material fact issues con-
cerning RGM's performance under the contract. 448 Specifically, Tribble
argued that the construction standards and tolerances incorporated into
the general contract were applicable to RGM under the subcontract.
449
The court of appeals agreed, interpreting the subcontract to incorporate
the general contract's standards. 450 In addition, because the subcontract
contained a satisfaction clause giving the architect final-approval author-
ity, the architect's rejection of RGM's work bound the court to determine
that RGM was not entitled to summary judgment.45 1 The court further
noted that "when a contract requires performance to the satisfaction of
an architect or engineer, the expert testimony of that architect or engi-
neer may be admissible to determine if the required work was reasonably
with the scope of the contract. '452
C. CONDITIONAL PAYMENT CLAUSES
The Amarillo Court of Appeals addressed conditional-payment clauses
in retainage in Pyramid Constructors, L.L.P. v. Sunbelt Controls, Inc.453
Pyramid Constructors entered into a construction contract with Port
Neches-Groves Independent School District to construct additional
school structures and improvements. Pyramid hired Sunbelt to install
heating and air-conditioning equipment. The subcontract allowed Pyra-
mid to withhold retainage from each payment. Sunbelt completed its
work in January 2000 and sent a final bill for retainage. Pyramid com-
pleted its work in May 2000 and submitted an invoice for retainage on the
entire project. Because of a dispute with the owner, "the school district
refused to release a portion of the retainage." Pyramid also withheld a
portion of the retainage due to the subcontractors. Sunbelt filed suit
against Pyramid to recover the balance due.4 54 The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of Sunbelt and against Pyramid to pay
retainage, plus interest and attorney's fees.455
Pyramid's first argument on appeal was that Sunbelt assumed the risk
that the district would not pay Pyramid; therefore, Pyramid was not re-
quired to pay its subcontractor until it received payment from the dis-
trict.456 The agreement at issue provided that "[a]ll payments to
Subcontractor shall be made by Pyramid solely out of funds actually re-
ceived by Pyramid from Owner" and noted that Sunbelt was sharing the
448. Id. at 650.
449. Id.
450. Id. at 651.
451. Id. at 654.
452. Id. at 655.
453. No. 07-03-0443-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 1568, at *2-3 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
Feb. 28, 2005, no pet.).
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Id. at *4.
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risk that the owner may fail to make payments. 457 The contract also pro-
vided an exception for the clause, that if the owner failed to pay Pyramid
because of default solely attributable to Pyramid, the payment would be
due from Pyramid to the subcontractor.4 58 Pyramid argued that the "pay
when paid" language shifted the non-payment burden to Sunbelt.459 Sun-
belt argued that the language was not a condition precedent, but a timing
provision.460
The court declined to opine on whether the language was a condition
precedent or a covenant, and instead it focused on the exception to the
language.4 61 It concluded that the reason for the owner's non-payment of
retainage was solely attributable to Pyramid, and that Pyramid had a duty
to pay Sunbelt.462 The court also concluded that it was not Sunbelt's bur-
den of proof to establish that Pyramid was in default of its contract with
the district in order to recover. 463 The contract language stated the ex-
ception in terms of failure to pay Pyramid "on account of default solely
attributable to Pyramid," but did not require that there be an actual de-
fault by Pyramid. 464
VIII. BREACH & WAIVER OF WARRANTY
In Richardson v. Duperier, the Houston Court of Appeals held that an
express warranty against failure due to defective workmanship or materi-
als superseded the implied warranty of good and workmanlike construc-
tion.4 6 5 In so holding, the court followed Centex Homes v. Buecher in
which the Texas Supreme Court called the implied warranty of good and
workmanlike manner a "gap filler" that applied unless and until the par-
ties to a construction contract "provided for the manner, performance or
quality of the desired construction. '466 The implied warranty cannot sim-
ply be disclaimed, but an express contract clause can supersede the need
for it.4 67 The contract at issue provided that Duperier "warrants its prod-
ucts against failure due to defective workmanship or materials for a pe-
riod of one year from completion date." 468 Richardson filed suit after the
one-year warranty term, so Duperier was entitled to summary judgment
on Richardson's breach-of-warranty claim.469
457. Id. at *5-6.
458. Id. at *6.
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. Id. at *6-7.
462. Id. at *8.
463. Id. at *9.
464. Id. at *8.
465. No. 14-04-00388-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 2746, at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] Apr. 12, 2005, no pet. h.).
466. Id. at *9-10 (citing Centex Homes v. Buecher, 95 S.W.3d 266, 273-75 (Tex. 2002)).
467. Id.
468. Id. at *9.
469. Id. at *12.
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The implied warranty of habitability applies only to present defects
that make the property "unsuitable for its intended use as a home and
unfit for human habitation." 470 In Todd v. Perry Homes, the Todds, sub-
sequent purchasers of a house that Perry Homes built, challenged Perry
Homes' no-evidence summary judgment that the trial court granted, on
the ground that they presented evidence that drainage problems created
a risk of mold, rot, or termites.471 Finding that the implied warranty of
habitability applies only to the home's current condition, the court of ap-
peals affirmed the trial court's judgment that evidence of future habitabil-
ity issues is not evidence of breach of the implied warranty of
habitability. 472
IX. CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS AND
INSURANCE COVERAGE
In the context of a commercial-liability policy, Texas courts continue to
discuss the question of whether an alleged construction defect can ever
qualify as an "occurrence" and trigger an insurer's duty to defend or to
indemnify in favor of an insured contractor. The 2004 and 2005 decisions,
especially compared with those in earlier years, make it clear that this
question will be determined on a case-by-case basis and may be depen-
dent upon a particular court's views about the allegations presented.
While the decisions have indicated that state courts are reluctant to ex-
pand coverage to include damages for the insured contractor's defective
work, there continues to be emphasis on analyzing the definition of "oc-
currence" and the meaning of "property damage."
A. "OCCURRENCE"
In Gehan Homes, Ltd. v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co., the Dallas
Court of Appeals concluded that Gehan Homes raised a fact issue as to
whether it was owed a duty to defend a suit brought by owners of a home
built by Gehan.473 Both in their summary-judgment motions and on ap-
peal, the insurers argued that, under the policies, the case did not allege
an "occurrence" that would trigger the duty to defend. 474 In reversing
the trial court, the court of appeals determined that, in reviewing a duty
to defend, the court was bound to construe the underlying pleadings lib-
erally in favor of the insured. 475 In addition, Texas law indicated that a
negligent breach of a construction contract resulting in defect damages
constitutes an occurrence "because the relevant inquiry is not whether
the insured damaged his own work, but whether the resulting damage
470. Todd v. Perry Homes, 156 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet. h.).
471. Id. at 921.
472. Id.
473. 146 S.W.3d 833, 843 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. filed).
474. Id. at 837.
475. Id. at 838.
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was unexpected and unintended. ' 47 6 Because the pleadings alleged negli-
gence on builder's the part, the court found that an occurrence triggering
the insurers' duty to defend was alleged in the underlying suit, and re-
versed the trial court.477
On similar grounds, the court reversed the insurers' summary judgment
on the issues of whether "property damage" and "bodily injury," as de-
fined by the insurance contract, had been sufficiently alleged in the un-
derlying suit in order to trigger the duty to defend. 478 Again, the insurers
argued that the property-damage claim was essentially a contract claim,
but the court determined that it would not disregard the claims as pro-
vided in the underlying petition.479 The owners sought damages for "loss
of use" and physical injury to tangible property.480 These allegations,
said the court, were for damages related to property damage covered by
the liability policies.481 The owners also sought damages for physical in-
juries and mental pain. These claims, argued the insurers, were not cov-
ered by the policy because they were essentially damage allegations for
mental anguish.482 Even though the owners pleaded these damages
under the general heading "Mental Anguish," the court was bound to
construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the insured, and it found that
the owners properly alleged bodily injury.483
B. No DUTY TO DEFEND OR INDEMNIFY FOR EXCLUDED
CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS
In a similar declaratory-judgment suit, Primary Plumbing Services, Inc.
v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, the Houston Court of Ap-
peals for the First District determined that the insurer had no duty to
defend or indemnify Primary Plumbing Services in an underlying suit
where the insurance policy expressly excluded coverage for claims involv-
ing construction defects. 484 In the underlying suit, the plaintiff was in-
jured when a wall-hung lavatory fell on her. The plaintiff alleged,
[Primary], in the course of its plumbing duties was to install a wall
hung lavatory on the premises. [Primary] did not install the wall
hung lavatory properly and as a result [the plaintiff] was injured.
This failure to follow proper plumbing practices in installing the lava-
tory constitutes negligence. 485
Lloyds argued that an "accident" creating an "occurrence" under the pol-
476. Id. at 843.
477. Id. at 846.
478. Id.





484. No. 01-05-00135-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 9622, at *13-14 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] Nov. 17, 2005), withdrawn, No. 01-05-00135-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 718
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 26, 2006).
485. Id. at *3.
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icy was not alleged and that it was entitled to summary judgment.486 The
court of appeals agreed, finding that the underlying petition did not al-
lege facts within the policy's scope.4 87 Specifically, the court found that
the insurance policy excluded coverage for claims "involving construction
defect(s)," and that the policy's exclusion was not limited to certain types
of claims or damages. 488 Because the policy did not define "construction
defect," the court looked to the dictionary definition of "construct" and
concluded that the factual allegations in the underlying petition "essen-
tially alleg[ed] that [Primary] negligently constructed, built, or assembled
the lavatory in question. ' 489 Because the policy excluded any claims "in-
volving" construction defects, it excluded the plaintiff's claims in the un-
derlying suit.4 90 The court rejected, as a matter of law, Lloyd's duty to
indemnify Primary for the same reason. 4
91
C. COVERAGE-PROPERTY DAMAGES
In Lennar Corp. v. Great American Insurance Co., the Houston Court
of Appeals determined whether Lennar's costs to remove a defectively
designed synthetic stucco from approximately 400 homes constituted
"property damage" under its liability insurance policies.492 After the
stucco's defective nature was discovered, Lennar filed a declaratory-judg-
ment action to determine coverage and indemnity obligations under sev-
eral liability policies. 493 The trial court denied Lennar's summary-
judgment motion and granted summary judgment in favor of each insur-
ance carrier on coverage issues.4 94 The court of appeals affirmed Len-
nar's denied motion for summary judgment and the coverage issues
related to the removal, but reversed the trial court on the indemnity issue
for water damage repair costs. 495
On appeal, Lennar argued that the trial court erred in finding that the
policies at issue did not cover the costs associated with removing the
stucco. Specifically, Lennar argued that because the stucco was causing
or could potentially cause rot, termites, and mold, his removal costs were
"property damage" caused by an "occurrence" under the policies. The
insurance companies disputed that there was "property damage" or an
"occurrence." To determine whether summary judgment was warranted,
the court engaged in contract interpretation.4 96
486. Id. at *4.
487. Id. at *10.
488. Id.
489. Id. at *11.
490. Id. at *13-14.
491. Id. at *16
492. No. 14-02-00860-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 4214, at *3-5 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] June 2, 2005), withdrawn, No. 14-02-00560-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 1457
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 23, 2006).
493. Id. at *5.
494. Id. at *1-2.
495. Id. at *3.
496. Id. at *10.
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"Occurrence" under the policies was defined as "an accident, including
continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harm-
ful conditions. '497 Under Texas law, damages caused by the insured's
negligent acts that are undersigned and unexpected are considered occur-
rences. If an intentionally performed act causes harm because of negli-
gent performance, this is also an accident under Texas law.498 The
carriers argued that, as a matter of law, defective construction cannot
constitute an occurrence because the damage is to the insured's own
work. The court of appeals disagreed and held that Lennar did establish
that there was an occurrence. 499 The court noted that while Texas law is
"unsettled" on the issue, defective construction is an occurrence so long
as "the resulting damage was unintended and unexpected. '50 0 From Len-
nar's standpoint, any damage resulting from the stucco's application was
unexpected and unintended, and thus constituted an occurrence.5 01 Even
though Lennar chose the defectively designed stucco product,
the subcontractor exception is quite broad. Its application is not lim-
ited to situations where the subcontractor's fault caused the damage.
Instead, it merely applies if the damaged work or the work out of
which the damage arises was performed on Lennar's behalf by a
subcontractor.502
The carriers fared better on the issue of whether stucco's removal costs
constituted "property damage" under the policies. Here the court found,
as a matter of law, that those costs were not "damages because of prop-
erty damage. '50 3 The policies defined property damage as "physical in-
jury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use of that
property. '504 The court distinguished between three different categories
of damages: costs to repair water damage, including the costs to remedi-
ate any rot, mold, or termites resulting from the stucco; costs to remove
it; and overhead costs, inspection costs, etc.50 5 Of these categories, the
policy defined only the first as property damage. 50 6 These damages were
susceptible to coverage under the policies. 50 7 But the policies did not
cover Lennar's costs to remove it because, under the summary-judgment
evidence, the court could not conclude that the stucco had to be replaced
in order to repair water damage. 50 8 "Therefore, the costs incurred by
Lennar to remove and replace the stucco as a preventative measure are
497. Id. at *17-18.
498. Id. at *18 (citing Lloyd's of Tex. v. Main Street Homes, Inc., 79 S.W.3d 687, 693
(Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.)).
499. Id. at *20.
500. Id. at *29.
501. Id. at *42.
502. Id. at *42 n.27.
503. Id. at *48.
504. Id. at *43.
505. Id. at *43-44.
506. Id.
507. Id. at *45.
508. Id. at *49-53.
1132 [Vol. 59
Construction and Surety Law
not damages because of property damage. 5 °9
Likewise, costs associated with overhead, inspections, and personnel
were not covered because Lennar was not "legally obligated" to pay
these; that is, "[w]hile Lennar may have been legally obligated to pay the
third-party EIFS claims by replacing the stucco, making repairs, and/or
making cash payments, it was not legally obligated to incur its own over-
head costs, inspection costs, personnel costs, and attorneys' fees in con-
nection with settling the claims. '510
X. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND REPOSE
In Brent v. Daneshjou, the Austin Court of Appeals considered statutes
of limitation and repose in the construction and repair of a house that
Daneshjou built in 1990.511 Brent purchased the house in 1992 and no-
ticed water leaks soon after. Brent contacted Daneshjou about the leaks,
and Daneshjou completed repair efforts in January 1993. Again in 1995,
Brent noticed that the water leaks were recurring, and that there were
new leaks in other parts of the house. Daneshjou again undertook repair
efforts and suggested that Brent replace the roof, which he did. Brent
continued to experience problems with the house in the fall of 1998, when
the 1992 leak resurfaced. This time Brent did not contact Daneshjou;
rather, in December 2001, Brent began extensive mold remediation.
Brent sued Daneshjou on November 22, 2002, complaining that the origi-
nal construction was defective and that Daneshjou's 1993 and 1995 re-
pairs were insufficient to correct the water-incursion problems plaguing
the house.51 2
Daneshjou filed motions for summary judgment, arguing that the stat-
utes of limitation and repose had expired on all of Brent's claims and,
alternatively, that Brent offered no evidence on his breach of contract,
breach of warranty, fraud, and DTPA causes of action. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of Daneshjou on all claims. 513 The
court of appeals affirmed.514 The Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code
sections 16.008-.009 created the statute of repose at issue and provides
that, absent several exceptions, a homebuilder is free from liability ten
years after completing the building for "an action arising out of a defec-
tive or unsafe condition of the real property or a deficiency in the con-
struction or repair of the improvement. '515 Thus, absent tolling, the
statute of repose expired in 2000.516
509. Id. at *51-52.
510. Id. at *54-55.
511. No. 03-04-00225-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 9249 (Tex. App.-Austin Nov. 4,
2005, no pet. h.).
512. Id. at *24.
513. Id. at *1.
514. Id.
515. Id. at *7-9 (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.009(a) (Vernon
2005)).
516. Id. at *10.
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Although there was evidence that Daneshjou "cut corners" during the
initial construction of the house, the court found no evidence that
Daneshjou did so knowing that the house would thereby be dangerous or
deficient. 5 17 In addition, the court found no evidence that Daneshjou de-
liberately concealed the construction deficiencies that led to Brent's leaks
and mold problems while Daneshjou was repairing the leaks.5 18 Thus,
the statute of repose was not tolled on the home's original construction
and all of Brent's claims concerning the construction were barred.5 19
The statute of limitations ran on most of Brent's other claims against
Daneshjou. 520 The 1993 repairs were barred because Brent discovered in
1995 that the repairs had been insufficient, more than four years before
he filed suit.52 1 Likewise, absent tolling, a four-year statute of limitations
expiring in 1999 would bar claims on the 1995 repairs. 522 The recurrence
of the window "leak in 1998 ended tolling from the discovery rule. '523
But, because the leak's rediscovery had been alleged to occur in the fall
of 1998, a fact question remained as to whether the leak was rediscovered
before or after November 22, 1998.524 Other repairs made in 1995, spe-
cifically to the home's stucco exterior, were not barred because
Daneshjou had not conclusively shown that Brent should have discovered
that the repairs were insufficient before 2001.525
Unfortunately for Brent, those claims did not survive Daneshjou's no-
evidence motion for summary judgment. 526 Daneshjou argued, and the
court agreed, that Brent produced no evidence (a) of a repair-services
contract between them, (b) of a breach of a warranty under the DTPA,
(c) of fraud, and (d) of proximate causation on any of Brent's other
causes of action. 527 Also, because Daneshjou undertook the repair ser-
vices for free, any potential contract failed for consideration.5 28 Because
Brent had not paid for the services, he was not a consumer under the
DTPA and, therefore, had no standing to assert DTPA violations. 529 The
court found no evidence of fraud, which Brent sought to prove by focus-
ing on representations and silence concerning the fact that Daneshjou
"cut corners" during the home's initial construction. 530 Finally, the court
agreed with Daneshjou that Brent produced no evidence of proximate
cause on any alleged negligence or breach of warranty with respect to
517. Id. at *18-19.
518. Id. at *19-20.




523. Id. at *24.
524. Id. at *24-25.
525. Id.
526. Id. at *28-32.
527. Id.
528. Id. at *28.
529. Id. at *29-30.
530. Id. at *30.
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Daneshjou's repair work.5 31
XI. CONTRACTOR LIABILITY FOR
SUBCONTRACTOR'S EMPLOYEES
As discussed in prior articles, during 2001 and 2002, the Texas Supreme
Court analyzed in some detail the prerequisites for holding a contractor
liable for the negligence of a subcontractor's employees. In Lee Lewis
Construction, Inc. v. Harrison532 and Dow Chemical Co. v. Bright, the
court outlined the elements of control that were required in order to find
contractor liability for acts of a subcontractor's employees.533
During 2003, the Austin Court of Appeals applied those principles in
Qwest Communications International, Inc. v. AT&T Corp.534 This case
involved Qwest's construction of nationwide fiber-optic-communications
networks in order to compete against AT&T and other companies. In
1996, Qwest was laying fiber-optic cable in highway rights-of-way be-
tween Austin, San Antonio, and Houston. AT&T's fiber-optic cables al-
ready in existence were also buried in the same rights-of-way. Qwest
informed AT&T of its activities, and AT&T had on-site representatives
to aid in coordinating efforts and to mark the AT&T cables to prevent
their damage. 535
In order to conduct the required work, Qwest hired C&S Directional
Boring Company, Inc. as a subcontractor, and C&S hired CK Directional
Drilling as its subcontractor. On September 16, 1997, Qwest severed one
of AT&T's cables. In October and December 1997, CK severed the cable
a second and third time. AT&T filed suit against Qwest and C&S, seek-
ing damages and other relief. At trial, the Travis County District Court
awarded economic and exemplary damages to AT&T. On appeal, Qwest
argued that it should not have been held liable for the acts of C&S and
CK.
5 3 6
At trial, the district court submitted four questions to the jury concern-
ing whether C&S was under Qwest's control and whether CK was under
C&S's control during the construction and cuts. 537 With respect to the
second and third cuts, the questions submitted to the jury included (1)
whether C&S was "conducting operations for the benefit of Qwest and
subject to the control by Qwest as to the detail of the work" and (2)
whether CK was "conducting operations for the benefit of C&S Boring
and subject to control by C&S Boring as to the details of its work. '538
Qwest made two arguments on appeal: "(1) because AT&T did not re-
531. Id. at *32.
532. 70 S.W.3d 778, 783-84 (Tex. 2001).
533. 89 S.W.3d 602, 606-07 (Tex. 2002).
534. 114 S.W.3d 15 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, pet. granted), rev'd in part, 167 S.W.3d
324 (Tex. 2005).
535. Id. at 21-23.
536. Qwest, 167 S.W.3d at 321-23.




quest a question as to whether Qwest controlled the details of CK's work
and the questions did not submit a respondeat superior theory for CK,
AT&T waived the theory as between Qwest and CK; and (2) the evi-
dence as to the contractors' lack of independence was legally and factu-
ally insufficient. '539
The Austin Court of Appeals noted the general rule that "an employer
or owner is not liable for the acts of its independent contractors. '540 The
court specified that "for a general contractor to be liable for its indepen-
dent contractor's acts, it must have the right to control the [works] means,
methods, or details. ' 541 The court also specified that "the control must
relate to the injury the negligence causes, and the contract must grant the
contractor at least the power to direct the order in which work is
[performed]. "542
The court of appeals first concluded that the evidence presented was
sufficient to support the judgment of Qwest's liability, finding evidence of
both actual control and the contractual right to control. 543 The court
noted that C&S contractually retained some control over CK's work, and
C&S retained the right to control CK's hiring decisions in its contract.
CK and C&S shared equipment, and the court noted that there was no
practical difference between CK and C&S.544 In addition, the court
found that Qwest's contract specified that Qwest had the right to direct
and control C&S, including details in C&S's work, and that Qwest exer-
cised such control. 545
The court also rejected Qwest's theory regarding jury questions,
holding
that where issues that constitute only a part of a complete and inde-
pendent ground are omitted and other issues necessarily referable to
that ground are submitted and answered, the omitted elements are
deemed found in support of the judgment if no objection to the omit-
ted elements is made, and the answers are supported by some
evidence. 546
The court noted that "it was AT&T's burden to obtain an affirmative
finding of Qwest's control over CK," but that it was Qwest's burden to
object to the omission.547 Because Qwest did not object and because
"the omitted issue constituted only a part of a complete and independent
ground" of recovery, the other evidence at trial supported the finding.548
The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the evi-
dence supported a finding that Qwest controlled C&S, that C&S con-
539. Id.
540. Id.
541. Id. (citing Lee Lewis Const., Inc. v. Harrison, 70 S.W.3d 778, 783 (Tex. 2001)).
542. Id.
543. Id. at 35.
544. Id.
545. Id.
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trolled CK, and that Qwest controlled CK.54 9
In Qwest International Communications, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., the Texas
Supreme Court granted certification to answer the question of whether
evidence that "a corporation's policy [promoting] 'a hurried pace' that
resulted in accidentally cutting a competitor's fiber-optic cable was legally
sufficient to support an award of exemplary damages." 550 Finding lack of
evidence that those who adopted the policy "knew they posed an extreme
degree of risk," the court reversed the Austin Court of Appeals.5 51 Al-
though the policy resulted in Qwest three times cutting AT&T's fiber-
optic cables, the award of exemplary damages could not be sustained.552
"What is lacking is clear and convincing evidence that Qwest's upper
management had actual knowledge that a policy to lay cables rapidly
posed a degree of risk that was extreme; knowledge of a remote possibil-
ity of serious injury or a high probability of minor injury was not
enough... Nor is there evidence that they proceeded with the construc-
tion in conscious disregard of such a risk. '553 Thus, a reasonable jury
could not have formed a firm belief that Qwest acted with the malice
required to collect exemplary damages. 554
XII. RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION LIABILITY ACT
In Bankhead v. Maddox, the Tyler Court of Appeals said that Bank-
head waived her right to appeal a jury award of zero attorneys' fees in her
construction-defect suit against Maddox.55 5 Bankhead's appeal brief fo-
cused on Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 38.001, which
mandates attorney's fees in breach-of-contract actions. However, Mad-
dox argued that Bankhead ignored the Residential Construction Liability
Act ("RCLA"), 556 which applies to house construction.557 The court of
appeals agreed with Maddox that the RCLA superseded the Civil Prac-
tices and Remedies Code to the extent that the two conflicted. 558 Be-
cause the RCLA does not mandate attorney's fees, the RCLA was the
controlling law.559 Also, because Bankhead did not raise the RCLA on
appeal, she waived the issue, and the trial court's judgment was
affirmed. 560
549. Id. at 46.
550. Qwest, 167 S.W.3d at 325.
551. Id. at 325-26; see TEX. Civ. PRc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.001(11) (Vernon 2003).
552. Qwest, 167 S.W.3d at 327.
553. Id. at 327.
554. Id.
555. 135 S.W.3d 162, 165 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2004, no pet.).
556. Id. at 163.
557. Id.; TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 27.002 (Vernon 2006).
558. Bankhead, 135 S.W.3d at 163.
559. Id.
560. Id. at 164.
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XIII. THE SUBSTANTIAL-PERFORMANCE DOCTRINE
The appellate courts addressed two interesting cases on the doctrine of
substantial performance and its relationship to a party's ability to sue for
breach.
A. FINAL PAYMENT
In TA Operating Corp. v. Solar Applications Engineering, Inc., the San
Antonio Court of Appeals was faced with an issue of first impression in
Texas: "whether the doctrine of substantial performance excuses a con-
tractor's [non-performance of an] express condition precedent to final
payment of a contract. '561 The trial court answered in the affirmative,
but the court of appeals disagreed. 562 In this case, the express condition
precedent was an all-bills-paid affidavit, which was intended to foreclose
the possibility that TA, the owner, would have to pay twice on truck-stop
construction. 563
TA did not dispute that Solar had substantially performed under the
contract. Instead, it relied on an express condition in the contract that
stated: "[tjhe final Application for Payment shall be accompanied by:...
iii) complete and legally effective releases or waivers (satisfactory to
OWNER) of all Lien rights arising out of or Liens filed in connection
with the Work. '564 When Solar filed suit for final payment, it had not
secured such waivers or releases, and the evidence showed that the prop-
erty was burdened with liens totaling almost $250,000.565 The court of
appeals acknowledged that the substantial-performance doctrine was in-
tended to modify the common-law rule of strict compliance with contract
terms,566 but held that the substantial-performance doctrine applied only
to constructive conditions precedent, not to express conditions precedent.
A constructive condition precedent is one that, though not express in a
contract, obligates the other party to perform once it is met. The all-bills-
paid affidavit, on the other hand, was an express condition precedent
written in the contract. 567 Therefore, the court rendered judgment that
Solar take nothing on its breach-of-contract claim.568
B. SUBSTANTIAL PERFORMANCE, MATERIAL BREACH,
AND EXCUSED PERFORMANCE
In Hooker v. Nguyen, the Houston Court of Appeals found that
Hooker, a salon developer, was excused from paying Nguyen, the con-
561. No. 04-04-00180-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 7908 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Sept.
28, 2005, pet. filed).
562. Id. at *1.
563. Id. at *15.
564. Id. at *4-5.
565. Id. at *5.
566. Id. at *10-11, *15-16,
567. Id. at *14-15.
568. Id. at *16.
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tractor, because Nguyen failed to substantially perform the contract. 569
Hooker contracted with Nguyen to provide build-out construction work
for a salon. The original contract did not include a completion date. 570
Hooker became anxious when, in mid-October, he noted that Nguyen
was failing to make progress on the build-out. Hooker sent a letter to
Nguyen dated November 30, 2000, in which Hooker claimed that the
original due date was December 1, the date that Hooker was to begin
paying rent on the space. 571 By January 18, 2001, the salon was still in-
complete. The parties met and signed a document that listed outstanding
tasks to be completed by Nguyen before February 4, 2001. This date
passed, and on February 11, 2001, Hooker notified Nguyen that he was
terminating their contract. On February 12, 2001, Hooker's lawyer sent
Nguyen a letter claiming that he was in substantial breach of the agree-
ment. Hooker refused to pay the contract's $44,159.20 outstanding
balance.572
The jury found for Nguyen on the breach-of-contract issue and said
that Hooker was not excused from performing. 573 But the jury also
found that Nguyen breached the agreement and failed to substantially
perform.574 Following Mustang Pipeline Co. v. Driver Pipeline Co., the
court applied the Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 241, which
contains five factors to determine whether a failure to perform is
material:
(a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the ben-
efit which he reasonably expected; (b) the extent to which the in-
jured party can be adequately compensated for the part of that
benefit of which he will be deprived; (c) the extent to which the party
failing to perform or to offer to perform will suffer forfeiture; (d) the
likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will
cure his failure, taking account of the circumstances including any
reasonable assurances; (e) the extent to which the behavior of the
party failing to perform or to offer to perform comports with stan-
dards of good faith and fair dealing.575
The court also noted that section 242 lists "significant circumstances that
aid in a determination of whether a party's duties are discharged under a
contract due to the other party's material breach. ' 576 Those circum-
stances are whether the failure to perform causes a delay that prevents
the party from making alternative arrangements and whether the contract
has a firm due date that, under the circumstances, indicates that the date
569. No. 14-04-00238-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 8753, at *32 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] Oct. 20, 2005, pet. filed) (mem. op.).
570. Id. at *3.
571. Id. at *34.
572. Id. at *5-7.
573. Id. at *7.
574. Id. at *8.
575. Id. at *24-25 (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (1981)).
576. Id. at *25.
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is important. 577 Based on Nguyen's failure to complete the project on
time or to cure his failure to perform, his delays that prevented Hooker
from making alternative construction arrangements, and the jury's deter-
mination that Nguyen failed to substantially perform, the court of appeals
found this to be a material breach excusing Hooker's performance under
the contract. 578 Thus, the court reversed judgment against Hooker and
rendered judgment that Nguyen take nothing. 579
XIV. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
During 2005, the legislature made some revisions to the Property Code
in regard to mechanic's liens. Most significantly, however, the legislature
clarified the scope of immunity from suit for a governmental entity that
contracts for services with a private party.
A. THE PROPERTY CODE
Texas Property Code section 53.103 regarding liens on retained funds
was revised in 2005, to provide as follows:
A claimant has a lien on the retained funds if the claimant:
(1) sends the notices required by this chapter in the time and man-
ner required; and
(2) files an affidavit claiming a lien not later than the 3 0 th day after
the earlier of the date:
(A) the work is completed;
(B) the original contract is terminated; or
(C) the original contractor abandons performance under the
original contract. 580
B. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS
The Texas Legislature adopted legislation in 2005 that made it clear
that a public entity that enters into a contract waives immunity from suit
with respect to any action relating to the contract. 581 The Government
Sovereign Immunity Bill, House Bill 2039, addressed this issue, which is
codified in Chapter 271 of the Local Government Code.582
Chapter 271.151 of the new statute contains relevant definitions for the
provisions. 583 Section 271.152 contains the scope of waiver, set forth as
follows:
A local governmental entity that is authorized by statute or the con-
stitution to enter into a contract and that enters into a contract sub-ject to this subchapter waives sovereign immunity to suit for the
577. Id. at *25-26.
578. Id. at *26-32.
579. Id. at *33.
580. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.103 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
581. TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. ch. 271 (Vernon 2003).
582. Id.
583. Id. § 271.151.
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purposes of adjudicating a claim for breach of the contract, subject to
the terms and conditions of this subchapter. 584
Section 271.153 limits the amounts of awards as follows:
(a) The total amount of money awarded in an adjudication brought
against a local governmental entity for breach of a contract subject to
this subchapter is limited to the following:
(1) the balance due and owed by the local governmental entity
under the contract as it may have been amended, including any
amount owed as compensation for the increased cost to perform
the work as a direct result of owner-caused delays or
acceleration;
(2) the amount owed for change orders or additional work the
contractor is directed to perform by a local governmental entity
in connection with the contract; and
(3) interest as allowed by law.
(b) Damages awarded in an adjudication brought against a local
governmental entity arising under a contract subject to this sub-
chapter may not include:
(1) consequential damages, except as expressly allowed under
Subsection (a)(1);
(2) exemplary damages; or
(3) damages for unabsorbed home office overhead.585
Section 271.154 provides that the contract's adjudication procedures,
including requirements to engage in alternative dispute resolution before
suit, are enforceable, except to the extent that they conflict with the stat-
ute.586 Additional sections provide that there is no waiver of immunity
from suit in federal court or for tort liability. 587 Finally, attorneys' fees
that the local governmental entity or any other party incurred in a claim
adjudication by or against a governmental entity are not awarded unless a
written agreement authorizes it.588
584. Id. § 271.152.
585. Id. § 271.153.
586. Id. § 271.154.
587. Id. §§ 271.156-.157.
588. Id. § 271.159.
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